Identifying and Communicating Pro-Poor Policy Messages to Policy Audiences: the Case of Chronic Poverty in Uganda.

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Acknowledgements

The research on which this paper is based was conducted through the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (www.chronicpoverty.org) with financial support from DFID, research grant no. R7847. The field-based research in 3 "LADDER study sites" depended on access to the LADDER household survey, survey instruments and sampling frame, village studies and various un-published qualitative research outputs. Thanks are due to Frank Ellis (team leader, ODG, University of East Anglia) and others in the LADDER team for their openness in sharing their household survey dataset and qualitative data with CPRC researchers. It was first written up as Bird and Shinyekwa, 2003a.



Q-Squared Working Paper No. 43
November 2007

1. Introduction

This paper discusses the processes surrounding the dissemination of findings from Q2 work exploring the drivers and maintainers of chronic poverty in Uganda to a range of policy audiences at the national and international level. It briefly introduces the research design and research methods used and the findings produced before discussing how an understanding of the challenges of getting certain issues on to policy agendas helped in the identification and targeting of different actors in the policy process with 'communication materials' of different types.

2. The research

The research presented here was undertaken in 2002 under the Chronic Poverty Research Centre. The author selected three of the nine sites in rural Uganda where an in-depth household survey of 315 households had been recently undertaken (in 2001, by LADDER[1]). The study sites were chosen on the basis of an initial analysis of the LADDER dataset and following a review of the qualitative village reports produced in 2002 by the LADDER team as a result of qualitative exercises with 2343 people in the nine study sites.

The nine LADDER study sites were selected purposively by the LADDER team to represent all the main agro-climatic zones and natural resource based livelihoods in Uganda. A wealth-ranking exercise was undertaken in each of the nine sites in order to generate a sampling frame. These commonly placed households into five or six strata which were combined by the LADDER research team to form three groups: poor, middle and non-poor. Thirty-five households were selected[2] from each village for the in-depth household survey, ten households from each of the middle and non-poor groups and fifteen from the poor group.[3]

The LADDER sites were not selected based on their poverty characteristics and cover an arc in the central west of the country to the central east, not touching on any of the currently poorest or conflict affected areas. The selection was effective for the original purposes of the LADDER research but limited our ability to understand the dynamics of chronic poverty. A more comprehensive understanding was generated by complementing the research in the 'LADDER villages' with additional field work in remote Kisoro, SW Uganda.

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[1] The LADDER project, funded by DFID, has worked in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Malawi. Godfrey Bahiigwa, from EPRC, led the Uganda component of this work. For more information about LADDER, see www.uea.ac.uk/dev/odg/ladder . This research depended on access to the LADDER household survey, village studies, various un-published qualitative research outputs. Thanks are due to Frank Ellis (team leader, ODG, University of East Anglia) and others in the LADDER team for sharing their dataset and qualitative data with CPRC researchers.

[2] In the fishing villages stratified sampling ensured that roughly half of the households were fisherfolk (e.g. 17 out of 35 in Kiribairya). This was to guarantee that the survey provided adequate information on fish-based livelihoods. Unfortunately this makes other issues difficult to explore with accuracy (e.g. mean village income figures, proportion of households involved in fish-based livelihoods, proportion of landless households, proportion of households in Kiribairya displaced by Teso ethnic cleansing who are owners of neither boats nor land). In addition, researchers selected alternative households when it appeared that the sampling process was generating an over-large number of households headed by a widow.

[3] Analysis of the results from this survey shows that the wealth groupings correspond well to household asset and income data although the picture is slightly less clear with regard to per capita income figures.

The CPRC research team chose two of their three sites from these nine, because of the severity of poverty their residents were found to experience (Buwopuwa[4] in Mbale District, and Kiribairya in Kamuli District), and the third, Kalangaalo (Mubende District), because of its location in the Luwero Triangle and the depth of its experience of conflict during the 1981-85 NRM (National Resistance Movement) bush war. So, while these villages are not representative of Uganda as a whole they can be said to be typical of the large numbers of poorer villages in rural Uganda (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Location of LADDER Study Districts[5].

Source: LADDER Project, 2002.

We assumed that the majority of the chronically poor would be found amongst the most severely poor, but wanted to test whether this was true, as well as identifying the key drivers, maintainers and interrupters of chronic poverty.

Analysis of the household survey provided an understanding of assets, livelihood portfolios, basic demographics, key shocks and responses to shocks and patterns of change over the five years preceding the LADDER (round one) household survey[6]. A mixed tool box of life histories, focus group discussions and key informant interviews was developed in order to generate evidence and analysis to help explain differential poverty trajectories between study sites, cohorts and individual households and to identify a range of explanatory variables for differential well-being outcomes.

Respondents for the 28 in-depth life history interviews were identified purposively. An average of 9 in-depth life histories (oral testimonies) were collected in each of the three villages. As a first step, the research team obtained full village listings from the previous LADDER participative wealth ranking exercises in the three study sites. This

[4] Buwopuwa was selected because the sampling frame for the poorest village in the Mbale sample, Bukhasusa, was no longer available. We re-analysed the dataset to develop a greater understanding of the three study villages, and the authors have undertaken two periods of field work in the selected study villages.
[5] For more information about LADDER, see www.uea.ac.uk/dev/odg/ladder
[6] The survey has now been panelised and in the future it will be possible to provide a full Q2 analysis of the panel alongside life histories.

was cross-checked with the household survey data to enable the stratified random selection of households. Households were selected, some from each wealth strata, with an over-representation of poor and very poor households. This generated a good mix of male and female household heads for interview. Subsequently, a number of follow-on life history interviews were conducted in each site with individuals selected purposively by their ascribed status (e.g. migrants, the destitute, the disabled, member of a youth-headed household, younger widow, head of a 'gap-generation household'[7]).

The life histories were collected during semi-structured interviews which traced an individual's life through from their earliest childhood to the present day, including key life-changing events. By talking also to the non-poor we hoped to identify some of the advantages which protected them from falling into poverty, and to show in what way the experiences of the severely and persistently poor differed from those of the transitorily poor. By talking to a person about their life, rather than taking a thematic approach, we hoped to identify path-determination in individuals' lives and to pin-point key moments of choice – or the absence of choice. The life-history interviews were also used to identify themes for further investigation through focus-group discussions and key-informant interviews.

Initial examination of the LADDER household survey, results from focus group discussions (with groups differentiated by age, gender, wealth and livelihood grouping) and key informant interviews identified issues for exploration through life histories and enabled the research team to verify the likely representativeness of findings from individual life histories. Subsequently, further analysis of the LADDER household survey was used to explore issues raised in life history interviews and to triangulate findings, where possible.

Furthermore, the results from analysis of the Uganda national household survey and the first and second Participatory Poverty Assessments were used to contextualise the findings from both the analysis of the LADDER household survey and the qualitative research at the three sites.

Tables 1 and 2 provide a quick overview of the three sites selected for in-depth study. They range in wealth and remoteness, with Kalangaalo the richest and best connected and Kiribairya the poorest and least well connected. More detailed descriptions can be found in Bird and Shinyekwa (2003) and LADDER (2001a, b, c).

2.1. Selective description of research findings[8]

Analysis of household data from the nine LADDER sites provided important contextual information about livelihoods and asset portfolios and poverty. It showed that the villages of Buwopuwa and Kiribairya were not just poorer than the other study sites in income terms but that they had a higher proportion of female headed households and had a low proportion of tin rooved dwellings. However, mean land and livestock ownership was higher in Buwopuwa than in many of the other study sites, suggesting that these productive assets were not necessarily protective of downward declines into poverty (see Table 1).

[7] Older person/persons (grandparent(s)?) in a household with a child/ children. No household members aged 14-45.

[8] This section of the paper draws strongly on Bird, K., & Shinyekwa, I. (2005) *'Even the 'rich' are vulnerable: multiple shocks and downward mobility in rural Uganda.'* Development Policy Review, 2005. 23 (1):55-85.

Household wealth ranks were correlated with a number of variables (education of household head, household education, land ownership, livestock ownership [in cattle equivalent units], household assets, ownership of tools, migration, the household's dependency ratio, receipt of transfers, and the livelihood diversity index). The strength of correlation varied amongst the villages and the only variables important in all three focal villages were land ownership and household assets. Education and the ownership of livestock and tools were important in some but not all of the villages (see Table 3). Looking at the dataset for all nine LADDER villages we found a significant difference (at the .01 level) between poor and non-poor households in terms of the ownership of land, livestock, tools and household assets.[9] There was a significant difference also (at the .05 level) in terms of the education level of the household head and reliance on own production for subsistence.[10] Which way causality runs for each of these variables is difficult to determine.

Land ownership in the study villages is closely related to wealth grouping. The poor have marginal holdings, and in Kiribairya only the non-poor own any land at all. Local inheritance practice (whereby all sons receive a portion of their father's land on marriage, rather than primogeniture where only the oldest son inherits) is resulting in land fragmentation. Many holdings are marginal, leading to un- and under-employment – particularly amongst the youth; reduced levels of aggregate and individual well-being and increased differentiation driven by the distress sale of land by households attempting to meet contingencies or clear debts.

This evidence was supplemented by analysis from participatory exercises (see Table 2, below) and the wealth-ranking information produced for the LADDER sampling frame indicates that between 26% and 62% of households are considered poor in their own communities.[11]

The life histories collected by the CPRC research team were found to provide a strong starting point for understanding the trajectories into and out of poverty that individuals and households follow. They enabled the identification of the most common covariant and idiosyncratic shocks which triggered a decline into poverty (drivers), the way in which these interlocked, and the constraints which prevented accumulation, investment and movement out of poverty (maintainers,[12] illustrated in Figure 2).

[9] Poverty in this case is determined by whether per capita income is above or below the poverty line for rural Uganda. Per capita income has been arrived at by calculating total household income from all sources (e.g. crop and livestock sales, the value of agricultural produce for home consumption, land rental, fisheries, casual labour, salaries and wages and remittances) divided by the adult equivalent units per household.

[10] Using a version of Dunn's test given in Siegel and Castellan (1988: 213-4).

[11] Kalangaalo, 61%; Kansambya, 42%; Kabbo, 28%; Bunabuso, 53%; Buwopuwa, 31%, Kiribairya, 26%; Iyingo, 61%; and Kinamwanga, 62%.

[12] In this first round of collecting life histories we interviewed only household heads who had been interviewed during the LADDER survey. This enabled us to move straight into the life-history interview, without having to spend time collecting basic household asset, income and livelihood data. Due to the large number of female-headed households this did not lead to a lack of women's stories, but may have biased our findings in other ways (e.g. inadequate attention to 'youth', women within male-headed households, the situation of co-wives, the chronic poverty of children, and so on). In subsequent research we plan to systematically interview other household members to explore intra-household differentiation (see Bolt and Bird, 2003 for an outline of the method that we hope to use) and other issues.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the LADDER Villages.

LADDER Village	Per capita Income (US$)[13]		Mean hh land holding (ha.)	Livestock Ownership in CEUs[14]		% female headed hh	Building materials of houses (%)	
	Mean	s.d.		Mean	s.d.		Brick/ concrete walls	Tin roof
Mbale								
Bukahasausa	191	193	0.54	0.54	0.90	17	0	60
Buwopuwa	180	188	2.17	1.72	2.24	23	6	46
Bunabuso	583	645	1.92	1.66	1.68	14	9	89
Kamuli								
Iyingo	512	894	0.71	1.56	4.76	17	23	43
Kinamwanga	246	704	1.12	5.37	11.19	11	49	63
Kiribairya	111	92	0.18	0.30	0.45	26	0	0
Mubende								
Kabbo	229	164	1.54	3.77	10.37	17	9	57
Kansambya	155	125	2.47	1.09	1.99	3	9	74
Kalangaalo	254	188	2.26	1.64	2.32	20	40	94

Evidence from the study sites shows that decline in well-being is associated with a web of meso-level constraints and shocks which commonly combined negatively with household-level shocks and socio-cultural or socio-psychological factors. Composite shocks and loss of assets propelled a number of previously non-poor households into severe and long-term poverty. Chronically poor households seldom faced a single problem or constraint, and found few opportunities for accumulation and escape. Those who were able to reduce the intensity of their poverty generally managed to do so as a result of several serendipitous events or factors combining.

[13] Ugandan Shilling figures converted to US dollars using the average rate during the first quarter of 2001 (when the survey was conducted) of USh.100,000 = US$57.85

[14] CEU = cattle equivalent unit:Pigs=0.14; Goats=0.12; Sheep=0.10; Turkeys=0.04; Chickens=0.02; Other=(given price/5% trimmed mean price for cattle)

Table 2: Key characteristics of the study sites

	Kiribairya	Buwopuwa	Kalangaalo
District	Kamuli	Mbale	Mubende
Population	74 households c. 520 people	204 households c.1080 people	237 households c. 1600 people
Ethnic groups	Bakenya, Basoga, Banyoro, Iteso, Jaluo	Bagishu	Baganda, Banyarwanda, Bakiga, Banyoro, Burndi, Botoro, Bashoga, Bagishu, Basamya
Physical description of area	Lake side, drought affected	Flat plateau, moist	Crop land, bisected by several streams
Accessibility	• Most remote of the three sites - very poor road access, good access via Lake Kyoga • 1½ - 2½ hour from Kamuli town (small town, poorly developed market and services)	• Good road access • 1 hour from Mbale town (substantial regional centre) • Near Kenyan border	• Least remote of the three sites - excellent road access
Level of service provision	Highly inadequate	Adequate	Good
Access to markets	Poor	Average	Excellent
Main livelihood activities	Fishing & fish processing, casual labour, some agriculture, small numbers of livestock	Annual crop production, matooke, coffee, some livestock, boda boda, brick making	Annual crop production, coffee, livestock, formal employment, alcohol production and sale, boda-boda, brick making, taxis, and construction
Key events	• 1986 - arrival of IDPs • 1995 - borehole • 2000 - flood swept away half of village • 2002 – storm demolished primary school, killing 2 children	2000 - borehole	• 1966 Kabaka exiled[15] late 1960s -1970s - widespread killings • 1981-85 NRM bush war – area seriously conflict affected • 1986 peace (after this the local trading centre grew as people invested) • mid 1980s coffee wilt • 1990 market liberalisation • 1994 Kabaka allowed to return • 1990s – boreholes & clinic built in village • 1996 - UPE[16] • 1997 rains destroyed crops • 2002 closure of local police post – crime increased

Source: Life history and key informant interviews, August – November 2002.

[15] Bugandan king
[16] Universal Primary Education

Table 3: Correlating wealth rank groups with selected assets/ h'h characteristics.

		Wealth ranking group with						
Village name	**Area owned (ha.)**	**Livestock**	**Tools**	**Household assets**	**Education of HH Head**	**Household education**	**Migrants**	**Dependency ratio**
BuwopuwaSpearman's	-.776**	-.756**	-.705**	-.749**	-.425*	-.303	-.027	-.011
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.011	.077	.878	.952
KiribairyaSpearman's	-.510**	-.255	-.261	-.485**	-.332	-.450**	.067	-.047
Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.140	.130	.003	.063	.007	.701	.788
KalangaaloSpearman's	-.519**	-.503**	-.311	-.571**	.098	.115	.211	-.172
Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.002	.069	.000	.581	.512	.224	.323

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
N = 35

2.1.1. Poverty trajectories

Evidence from focus group discussions and life histories in the three study sites provided us with important insights into poverty trajectories. Not surprisingly, when talking about their lives, the interviewees tended to focus on the individual and family events which had led to improvements and declines in well-being, and a supplimentary study would be necessary to explore the importance of macro-economic, institutional and political economy factors.

We found that membership of a non-poor family provides an individual with a number of positive and mutually reinforcing advantages: good diet; access to education; access to health care; higher status; a network of friends and patrons in and outside the village; the ability to travel outside the village, and therefore exposure to ideas; more land or livestock to inherit; and more likelihood of marrying well. However, these advantages cannot necessarily be used to predict that an individual and their household will be able to avoid either short or extended periods of poverty.

Analysis of the life histories and the LADDER dataset shows that most households are vulnerable to downward movements of well-being, not just those in the so-called 'vulnerable groups'. Analysis of well-being changes between 1996 and 2001 in the dataset shows that 64% of households felt that their situations had worsened over that period. The life histories confirmed the predominance of downward movement. Of the 28 individuals interviewed, 25 perceived that they had experienced decreased levels of well-being during their lifetime, 12 perceived a decline from middle or non-poor groups to being in the poorest group, and only 3 individuals felt that their well-being had been stable. None felt that their well-being had improved.

Coming from middle or non-poor groups did not protect individuals and households from declines in well-being, and of the 17 very poor interviewees, 6 described having started life in non-poor households and 6 in middle-ranking households. Interviews with older people illustrated that, in general, they had been much more prosperous during their early lives than they were now. Distorted recall may explain this, but the examples that individuals gave to support their stories were convincing. They included detailed descriptions of household livelihood portfolios, asset holdings (including housing design and type, landholdings and livestock numbers) and dietary patterns, and of their household's comparative wealth within the community, its involvement in village life and celebrations, and the size and composition of the household now and at various points in the past. The latter included its ability to attract and support members of the extended family and/or paid or unpaid servants and farm labour. This rich information enabled a judgement to be made about the relative status and well-being of the household in question.

Figure 2: The interlocking drivers of chronic poverty in rural Uganda



2.1.2. Drivers and maintainers of poverty

The often sharp declines described above illustrate the long-run negative impacts of the Amin and Obote I and II regimes, the NRM bush war, acute land fragmentation and the interlocking of other poverty drivers. The sustained economic growth of the last decade occurred from a very low base, and there is a widespread perception that this has yet to bring households and individuals back to the level of basic food security and well-being that was enjoyed early in the twentieth century. This is reflected in the stories of the majority of older life-history interviewees (from all wealth groups) who indicated that life had become harder, over the long term, across a range of dimensions.

The multidimensional and long-run impact of conflict is suggested by many of the life histories collected in Kiribairya (Kamuli) and Kalangaalo (Mubende) and by the first Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment (UPPAP 1), during which insurgency was cited as a key driver of poverty in 40% of the UPPAP sites (MFPED, 2000). The national household survey has consistently shown that the incidence of poverty is much higher in conflict-affected Northern Uganda (nearly 67% in rural areas) than in Central Uganda (under 26% in rural areas).

Capabilities and functionings are also of profound importance, and both national household data and UPPAP 1 indicate poor health, high dependency ratios and inadequate skills and education as strongly linked with poverty (Okidi, 1999; Okidi and Mugambe, 2002; Lawson, 2003). Alcohol dependence and problem drinking were found by UPPAP 1 to be widespread, rating only second to poor health as a perceived driver of poverty (MFPED, 2000; USAID, 2003). This is supported by our fieldwork findings.

As an interpretation of focus-group data on cultural or personally-based determinants of poverty, UPPAP 1 lists ‘idleness and laziness’ as the seventh most commonly cited driver of poverty. But whose views are represented here? This conclusion seems likely to be based on the local elite’s derogatory perceptions of the poor (see also Hossain and Moore, 1999; Woodhouse, 2003). Research in neighbouring Kenya repeats this picture, with local government officers stereotyping the poor as lazy, immoral and uncaring about the future, while the local people themselves see the poor as religious, hardworking (a lazy person is unlikely to survive) and deeply concerned about the future (World Bank, 1996).

In sum, the research found that while geographical remoteness was a factor driving poverty in the three study sites, isolation from markets, public services, information and decision-making was regarded by many poor people as simply providing a backdrop for the fundamental determinants of their poverty trajectories. Gender, wealth, locality and life experience influenced people’s interpretation of the fundamental poverty drivers but within this rich picture, it was clear that sequenced and composite covariate shocks combined with a range of idiosyncratic shocks to made even the ‘rich’ within the study sites vulnerable to long term declines in well-being.

3. Analysis of policy context, information use and processes

This section of the paper provides a brief analysis of the political economy and policy context around selected thematic areas; a identification and typology of policy actors, differentiated by level (international and national); an examination of their likely use of evidence in decision-making, and their (likely) preferred sources of information.

It then provides an analysis of the forms of 'communication tool' used to contribute in specific policy debates in particular arenas (e.g. round table discussions, journal articles, power point presentations) and the differential weighting given to different types (or combinations) of qualitative and quantitative evidence in these different communication tools.

3.1. The political economy barriers to effective policy engagement around selected issues[17]

This section explores the barriers to getting the problems facing people with mental illnesses, mental and physical impairments or alcohol dependency taken seriously in low income developing countries. These issues were identified as important by the Q2 research described above.

These issues are commonly ignored by political elites despite some of the problems being severe, widespread and experienced across all wealth strata. This may be because the scale and severity of the problems facing the poor, the chronically poor and the marginalised are not adequately recognised. However, it may also be because policy decisions are not strongly evidence-based and even if evidence was available, policy makers would be unlikely to change their stance. A contributing factor may be the dominant discourse around economic growth, development and poverty reduction which may have demarcated the 'space' for policy response in such a way that substantial investments in social policies for such marginalised groups are unlikely.

3.1.1 Problem poorly understood

Evidence poorly communicated to policy makers

Policy makers may lack information about the nature and scale of the problems and, as a result, they are seen as being small scale and of marginal interest. But the availability of robust research evidence on a topic does not mean that policy makers are aware of that evidence. Effective dissemination and communication can ensure that the facts are known, but even then the issue will have to compete with others and the recognition an issue receives may be heightened by effective representation.

There are numerous barriers that prevent adequate representation of people facing complex social problems. Individuals may not acknowledge common interest, may fail to identify common characteristics and may have interests which would clash with other groups members. The costs of mobilisation can exceed benefits in countries where potential members form a low proportion of the overall population, are widely spread, have powerful competing group identities, are poor and do not have access to telecommunications or ICTs[18].

The development of active social movements lobbying for policy change in support of poor, chronically poor and marginalised people is also commonly hampered by limited solidarity and group loyalty. Why is this the case? For example, an individual labelled by others as 'disabled' might feel that their strongest identifying characteristic is instead that that they are a farmer, mother, *Banyoro* or a Ugandan. The strength of an individuals' identification with a particular group can therefore be diminished by their identification with and loyalty to another group. Individuals commonly 'own'

[17] This section of the paper draws on Bird, K., and Pratt, N. with O'Neil, T., and Bolt, V.J. (2004a) 'Fracture Points in Social Policies for Chronic Poverty Reduction' October 2004. ODI Working Paper 242. www.odi.org.uk CPRC Working Paper 47 www.chronicpoverty.org

[18] ICTs – information and communication technologies.

numerous shifting and overlapping group identities. It is therefore likely that individuals self-exclude where membership of a certain group is associated with stigma or where the labelling of a group is regarded as pejorative.

Social movements representing category-based groups tend to suffer from weak and poorly trained leadership which is either co-opted or inadequately networked. Limited leadership experience and the strength of alternative identities can weaken the representative power of group leaders. For example, evidence from Uganda suggests that ethno-linguistic and geographic identity can overwhelm the local government representatives of disabled people, who become co-opted by local elites into representing the interests of their clan or local area rather than the interests of disabled people. Limited vertical solidarity between elite or non-poor individuals and poor people who share the same categorisation weakens the coherence of such movements. In addition, there tends to be considerable internal heterogeneity with individuals strongly aware of their differences from each other. These can lead to hierarchies, power asymmetries and 'internal' labelling which may affect how leadership drawn from one sub-grouping represents the group as a whole.

Atomised and with limited leverage, even through electoral politics, political movements may fail to take hold. Individuals may feel that their best hope is through cultivating 'friendships' with patrons. NGO lobbies, parliamentarians or other elected representatives, donors and development researchers may speak on their behalf. Such relationships, however, are generally asymmetric, and the weaker party may be unable to control the content or process of their engagement. This can lead to their interests being misrepresented, and their engagement being manipulated to benefit the interlocutor. Clientelistic relationships with individuals may alternatively provide them with some means of accessing (diverted) public funds, but are unlikely to result in the representation of their interests in public fora.

Evidence weakly used in policy formation

The political economy in many developing countries is such that the need to deliver improved rights for marginalised and vulnerable groups is rarely seen to justify either increased political attention or the devotion of increased resources to those groups.

Governments find it difficult to prioritise marginal groups and the chronically poor. They are unlikely to develop and implement policies favouring these groups over larger and more powerful groups, as they would have little to gain and much to lose as a result. As a result, evidence may be weakly used in policy formation.

Dominant discourse demarcates 'space' for policy response

The political processes surrounding policy agenda setting and policy making are commonly influenced strongly by the dominant poverty and development discourses. Policy discourse determines (and is determined by) what is sayable and thinkable (Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996). National discourses are significantly influenced in developing countries by donors.

For many years the Washington Consensus supported a neo-liberal agenda in which the 'rolling back of the state' and the 'enabling' of enterprise were dominant. There was a disinclination to welfare, despite social protection being the third pillar of the World Bank's poverty reduction strategy outlined in the 1990 World Development Report. This is only slowly shifting, and developing countries' poverty reduction policies commonly still focus primarily on growth (without considering the nature of growth) and on the 'economically active poor', with policies for social development

and asset creation for the poor concentrating largely on untargeted investments in the health and education sectors.

Although there are exceptions, for example in India, where there is a stronger focus on reducing income poverty. This world view results in an expectation that growth will result in significant and sustained poverty reduction with any remaining poverty being largely residual. The dominance of this way of thinking does not encourage a focus on investment or policy agendas 'outside the box'. The 'box' which delimits the areas of accepted focus can also be described as the 'framework of possible thought' (Chomsky, 1987). Issues which fall outside this box or framework are regarded as subversive or irrelevant. Thus, for example, alcohol dependence and mental illness are off the development map and development practitioners have been slow to take disability seriously. Research findings which identify such issues are rigorously interrogated and may even be intentionally and systematically undermined by the knowledge communities allied with the dominant paradigm.

Dominant poverty and development narratives may interact with, and support, elite perceptions. These elite perceptions commonly reinforce categorisations of the poor as deserving and undeserving. These categorisations are used to justify the limited attention and low budgetary allocations given to particular issues and groups. The categorisations of deserving and undeserving poor, in turn, determine the framing of certain research questions, so that some questions are emphasised and work on them funded, while others are not even fully articulated. A lack of research funding for these low priority areas limits the generation of empirical evidence which might challenge their perceived unimportance. The framing of research questions and the availability, or otherwise, of empirical evidence has an interactive relationship with both agenda setting and policy formation.

The problems of certain groups are seen as less important

The problems of certain groups appear to be seen by policy makers as unimportant. This perceived lack of importance is linked to particular poverty and development discourses, the emergence of which can be explained in a number of ways. People in the country's the political, social and economic elite may have clear perceptions about what causes poverty, how economic growth occurs and how poor people can escape from poverty. These 'elite perceptions' can draw on ideas of certain categories of poor people as being 'undeserving'. The 'undeserving poor' may be seen as lacking the entrepreneurial drive to make the most of opportunities in the economy and their behaviour and culture may exacerbate their problems, making it difficult for policy makers to help them. These issues are discussed briefly in the following sections on elite perceptions, the politics of blame and the culture of poverty.

Elite perceptions

European elites historically felt threatened by the poor and viewed poverty reduction measures as part of a 'civilising mission'. The development of welfare policies in Western Europe can be seen as 'the combined result of decisions made by rationally oriented elites to protect themselves against 'public evils', plus the active engagement of morally committed ideologues.' (Reis, 1999:135). This suggests that pro-poor social policy is more likely to be formed and effectively implemented if suitable combinations of ideological and pragmatic concerns can be identified. Lessons from South Africa and Brazil suggest that the elites in highly unequal and racially divided societies have limited vertical solidarity in poverty reduction (Kalati & Manor, 1999; Reis, 1999). In both, elites feel that their personal security is threatened by high levels of urban crime. In Bangladesh, which is (largely) ethnically and

religiously homogenous, the elite sees the poor as the repository of social morality (Hossain & Moore, 1999).

Elites may support policies which tackle the negative externalities of poverty if they feel that such investments are in their own interest. But they do not face revolution or the contagious epidemic diseases that European elites feared historically and which drove the development of social programmes. Elites in South Africa and Brazil fear violent crime but they invest privately in security rather than collectively (Kalati & Manor, 1999; Reis, 1999).

While the practical or rational interests of elites support poverty reduction policies it is not clear that either their fear of crime or their vertical solidarity creates a strong enough 'push' for change. In the absence of this 'push', education is identified as the best mechanism for reducing poverty in South Africa, Brazil, Bangladesh and Uganda. It is seen as being a pain-free and non-zero sum solution. Through education everyone can get richer without redistribution.

However, Hossain and Moore show that elite discourses in Bangladesh which support universal primary education as a key anti-poverty intervention could be shaped to widen support for investments in child nutrition (malnourished children cannot concentrate in school), health care (to reduced absenteeism), adult literacy (illiterate mothers cannot fully support the education of their children). A similar analysis of elite perceptions of poverty and the anti-poverty discourses in other countries could be used as the basis for understanding which could support the creation of a supportive policy environment for pro-poor social policy.

The culture of poverty

The idea of a *culture of poverty* was developed by Oscar Lewis (1965; 1969) and suggests that poverty is perpetuated through low levels of education, a lack of participation in mainstream society and the inherent socio-psychological, political and economic traits of the poor themselves. This theory suggests that the poor have a different culture to the rest of society which is characterised by deviant attitudes, values and behaviours (Patterson, 2000). These affect the way in which capital is transmitted intergenerationally and may result in individuals being unable or unwilling to take advantage of emergent opportunities (Moore, 2001).

Moore (2001) summarises the ongoing debate on the 'culture of poverty' theory and shows that at one end of a continuum, there are those (e.g. Edward Banfield) that believe that much if not most poverty is based upon the 'innate' characteristics of the poor, sometimes called the 'underclass'. Moore links this approach to concepts of the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor, and suggests that it is inherently racist and classist (Moore, 2001). This view suggests that any attempt to eradicate or alleviate poverty among the 'underclass' is doomed to failure (ibid.). The opposing view suggests that poverty emerges and persists solely because of socio-economic structures external to the value systems and behaviours of the poor. In between lie those, like Lewis, who believe that 'cultures of poverty' have emerged over generations to enable poor people to cope with their situation. Their values, beliefs and behaviours were once an appropriate response to the social, economic and political barriers that they faced but have become ossified and now limit the current generation's ability to respond to opportunities.

Some research has suggested that social class has a powerful influence on behavioural, social and psychological variables (Singh-Manoux & Marmot, 2005), but contradictory findings suggest that it is "*very difficult to make any comprehensive*

cross-cultural generalisations about the poor other than that they lack money and are often socially and politically marginalised" (Rigdon, 1998:17, in Moore, 2001).

There has been a focus in the United States literature on the perverse incentives generated by a welfare system. These include a reluctance to supply labour at low wages, teenage out-of-wedlock births, and the low levels of aspirations associated with continued welfare use which creates welfare dependency. By changing the behaviour of both recipients and their children welfare systems are argued by some in America as supporting the development and the reproduction of an underclass (Corcoran, 1995; Ario, *et al*., 2004).

Corcoran (1995) found that there was no evidence welfare receipt alters values or attitudes or had a consistent effects on the labour supply and earnings of welfare recipient's sons. However welfare-recipient parents were more likely to have daughters who received welfare and had became unmarried teenage mothers. Few studies disentangled the impacts of parental poverty from those of welfare use or separated short-term and longer-term reliance on welfare.

Findings from a study which analysed the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort in the US suggest that the extreme and persistent racial divide in wealth ownership in the US is at least partially the result of family processes during childhood (Keister, 2004). This is because household disintegration can result in child poverty, which in turn is associated with being a low income adult and the analysis of this data shows that African American households are less stable over time.

Evidence from low and middle income developing countries suggests that socio-cultural and psycho-social factors associated with being poor and excluded or discriminated against can create their own barriers to the escape from poverty. Research in India found that coming from a group which has been discriminated against over an extended period of time may have a persistent impact on the earning potential of members of that group through its impact on individuals' expectations of prejudice which suppresses motivation (Hoff & Pandey, 2004). Also some extended family systems can hold back individuals who might progress more economically if they took an individualistic approach to life. This can result in the kin system becoming a poverty trap for its members (Hoff & Sen, 2005). Other evidence shows that – despite the impact of working as a child on life long wages - parents who worked when they were children may send their own children to work because they feel that working will strengthen their characters or provide them with useful experience (Emerson & Souza, 2005).

However, some of the socio-cultural traditions, institutions and value systems which appear to entrench poverty - for example the gendered inheritance practices in South Asia and traditions in parts of Africa which encourage the investment of profit in social rather than financial or physical capital - are wide-spread across socio-economic groups and are "structural impediments that both the poor and the rich must negotiate" (Moore, 2001).

Moore (2001) suggests that the growing literature on coping strategies provides an alternative way of looking at 'culture of poverty' as it links the behaviour of the poor to the context in which they live. It is likely that the coping and survival strategies passed on from one generation to the next actually facilitate survival in the midst of bad or deteriorating socio-economic, political or environmental conditions, keeping the poor from destitution or death but often helping to reproduce the social and economic structures that obstruct escape from poverty – a form of 'adverse incorporation'. (Moore, 2001)

However, the notion of the poor having a particular culture or set of cultures or behaviours which intensifies and perpetuates their poverty has been challenged. Corcoran (1995) argues that intergenerational poverty in the United States is commonly the result of racial discrimination and a lack of opportunities that affect individuals in each new generation rather than an intergenerationally transmitted culture of poverty.

Not high on policy makers' agendas

There are many reasons why policy makers could ignore the issues facing poor, chronically poor and marginalised people. Most simply, it may be a matter of political arithmetic; there are not enough people affected by a particular issue in any one constituency to create the demand to address the problem. However, following the analysis above, this is unlikely to be the case; numbers of affected voters is at least enough to mean that such issues should figure in the discourse among others.

Problems might be fully understood and the scale and severity of the problem recognised, but policy makers may still be reluctant to respond. This may be because they make inaccurate assumptions about the distribution of benefits from growth and the effectiveness of traditional safety nets. These assumptions may lead them to believe that both the most efficient and the most effective way of generating improvements in well-being for poor, chronically poor and marginalised people is through economic growth, and that this will eventually result in widely spread income growth either directly or through remittances and other transfers. However, the household characteristics of the most severely and chronically poor largely excludes them from benefiting from economic growth in the wider economy and traditional safety nets have only ever protected some people, some of the time. Under pressure from the impacts of HIV/AIDS and societal change, these traditional systems cannot be relied on to move people out of chronic poverty or prevent its transmission to the next generation.

Alternatively, policy makers may be reluctant to respond because the national policy process has been distorted by clientelism and neo-patrimonialism. In neo-patrimonial states, a form of citizenship which binds individuals directly to the state above and beyond the ties of kinship, community and faction has failed to develop (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 6). State service is personalised rather than bureaucratic and functionaries do not necessarily see their roles as legally and professionally distinctive. Private and public roles overlap and the public sector is appropriated by private interests. The failure to institutionalise power enables it to be personalised in this way (van de Walle, 2001: 117), and access to public state institutions is seen as the main means of personal enrichment (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Illiberal structures and the weak institutionalisation of political practices, benefit the political elite but undermine 'the developmental state' (van de Walle, 2001: 116). So, neo-patrimonialism, a weak separation between public and private, and poor institutionalisation of the state prevent the development and implementation of effective pro-poor policy. This is even more the case where the poor are drawn from marginalised groups.

Clientelism is a key feature of neo-patrimonial states. It involves the exchange of gifts, favours and services, patronage and courtier practices (van de Walle, 2001: 118). Maintaining clientelistic relationships undermines representational relationships between citizens and political leaders, and makes it more difficult for the needs of the poor to be represented in policy fora or responded to adequately by government. Policy makers are likely to be drawn largely from national elites. Research has shown

that where there is limited vertical solidarity, elites are more likely to act to reduce poverty and inequality if they associate such changes with enhanced personal safety and economic security (Hossain & Moore, 1999, 2002). Arguments in favour of poverty reduction which are based on notions of equity and rights will appeal to policy makers' altruistic qualities but often need to be supported with efficiency arguments which illustrate that policy changes will support economic growth or other pressing objectives.

Vested interests may argue persuasively against policy innovations. For example, policies to reduce alcohol consumption may be countered by global beverage manufacturers concerned about reduced sales revenue and by Ministries of Finance concerned about lost tax revenue. Alternatively, policy makers' attention may be diverted by lobbies which are more visible, vocal and persuasive of the urgency of their case.

Not recognised as severe or large-scale problems

Issues may fail to be adopted by policy makers because they are not be seen to be sufficiently severe or large scale and policy makers do not feel they can justify allocating time or budget to the issue. As we have shown, this can be because the issues are poorly understood or because other constituencies and interest groups are more effective or more powerful and therefore more able to dominate the attention of policy makers, it may also be that policy narratives and the 'framework of possible thought' (Chomsky, 1987) are such that there is low demand for information on these issues, and so little research has been undertaken or it has been poorly disseminated. Donors play a substantial role in framing the possible – in low income countries they bring resources and knowledge to the table. It is therefore likely that a substantial proportion of the neglect of these issues can be attributed to their low priority among donors.

Keeley & Scoones (2000) have shown that for problems to be identified as serious and in need of immediate remedy, policy makers must be linked with researchers in active networks. Where researchers can demonstrate an easily articulated problem, support their argument with empirical evidence of the scale and severity of the problem *and* suggest practical and easily implementable solutions, so much the better. Expressing complex or nuanced realities is less likely to gain the attention of policy makers and researchers therefore tend to trade off rigour for impact by simplify their message and putting into a 'black box' complex or disputed analysis (ibid.: 9).

The interest that policy makers have in particular research findings, and their willingness to take them seriously and feed them into policy processes depends, in part, on the researcher's membership of networks, but also on whether the research topic and findings fit with the current discourses and lie within the 'framework of possible thought'. If outside this area, the researcher can expect to have their findings contested or ignored, blurring the distinction between the technical and the political (ibid.: 4). What is identified as fact is therefore socially constructed (ibid.: 7).

Complex and expensive: not a political winner

Policy responses to complex problems which are not amenable to single-agency interventions are daunting to policy makers. Policy design is technically complex and implementation is administratively demanding. Achieving success is likely to be expensive, and where the policy is aimed at helping marginalised groups, personal and career rewards can appear distant. These incentives will drive individuals to seek easier sources of success.

3.2. The political economy of poverty related policies in Uganda

A thorough understanding of the Ugandan political economy was necessary if findings about the drivers and maintainers of chronic poverty in Uganda were to have any hope of influencing policy. Thorough political analysis has shown that politics in contemporary Uganda holds as many threats as opportunities for reducing long-term poverty (Hickey, 2005). Little effort has been made amongst development actors in Uganda to articulate the type of 'pro-poor' or redistributive growth that is likely to be required to alleviate chronic poverty and key interest groups in Uganda are yet to be convinced that measures should be targeted at the poorest groups and regions. Many in Uganda also regard the poverty reduction agenda as externally imposed. This may mean that if poverty reduction is to stay on the political agenda commitment a broader and deeper group of supporters needs to be found, beyond the current 'champions' (ibid.).

3.3. Mapping the political context of pro-poor policy making in Uganda

In this section we describe a 'quick and dirty' exercise undertaken to map of the political context in Uganda. This built on the analysis presented above on the barriers to pro-poor policy engagement and of the politics of poverty related policy making in Uganda.

First, the main actors connected with policy processes in Uganda were identified. See Figure 3, below. Then a political interests map was developed, using an approach similar to that developed by Merilee Grindle (see Nash, Hudson and Luttrell, 2006). This involved prioritising the policy areas for the different actors identified in Figure 4, below. For this exercise some categories (e.g. national civil society) were subdivided. After this, an analysis was undertaken to assess the degree of influence each actor has over the policy process and the resources at their disposal to influence policy outcomes. Lastly an assessment was made of actual and potential alliances amongst actors.

This mapping exercise confirmed the relative power and influence of the Ministry of Planning, Finance and National Development and certain Parliamentary Committees (e.g. the Budget Committee) and highlighted the relative lack of influence of other actors (e.g. Parliament, many national NGOs).

This analysis was very helpful in developing a dissemination strategy for earlier work on the drivers and maintainers of chronic poverty in Uganda.

Figure 4: Key actors involved pro-poor policy processes in Uganda.

International actors

Multilateral and Bilateral donors
International Civil Society Organisations (e.g. NGOs, Trade Union Movement)
Private sector
Diplomatic representatives of other countries
International media
Regional bodies (African Union, East African Union, COMESA)

National actors

Parliament and Parliamentary Committees
Office of the President
Ministry of Planning, Finance and National Development
Education, Health, Agriculture and other Line Ministries
PEAP Steering Committees
Local government bodies
National civil society organisations
Political parties
Membership organisations (e.g. trade unions)
Social movements
Technical experts (sectoral specialists, academics)
Citizens
Media
Legislature
Police and army

3.4. Using evidence in decision-making

Running alongside this context mapping exercise was an attempt to assess how important evidence is in policy making in Uganda. Findings from elsewhere suggest that evidence, including research evidence, weakly influences policy decision making (Davies, 2005) (see also section 3.1., above)

Research evidence is not always valued highly by policy makers. They may feel that their own judgement, experience, tacit knowledge and substantive expertise is of greater weight than research-based evidence (ibid.). The values and self-belief of key policy-makers and political context are all extremely important. Decision-making in government and by the civil service, in many countries, is strongly affected by organisational norms, habit and tradition. Much of this tends towards reinforcing opinion-based decision-making.

Davies found that policy makers want both soft and hard evidence, including evidence that we might consider anecdotal, which would indicate whether they were 'heading in the right direction'. UK-based policy makers had not heard of experimental evidence and were not interested in it. Nor were they interested in the findings from systematic reviews of evidence.

3.5. Preferred sources of information in policy making

Davies found that even where policy-makers use evidence to contribute to their decision-making, they may not want to use *research-based* evidence (Davies, 2005). He found that policy makers in the UK go first to their special advisors for evidence, then to 'experts', then to think tanks and opinion formers, lobbyists and professional associations, media, their constituents, consumers and various service users and only then, if at all, do they turn to academics and research evidence (Davies, 2005). Why is this? A sample of policy makers in the UK told the Social Research Unit in the UK Cabinet Office (during qualitative research) that they found research evidence inaccessible. It was too long, too verbose, too detailed, too dense, impenetrable, full of jargon, too methodological, untimely and either non-relevant or irrelevant.

3.6. Selecting 'communication tools' for effecting policy engagement

The discussion above indicates that researchers need to think quite carefully about how they will communicate their research to policy audiences. Firstly, researchers need to segment their audience and identify which tool will be most appropriate for each.

In Table 3, below, I show how this might be approached.

Table 3: Appropriate modes of communication to different segments of the policy community

Segment	Communication tool	Influence on policy making
Key Ministers	• Short face-to-face meetings (formal/ informal) (verbal inputs supported by short research summaries/ Briefing Paper(s)/ Opinion Piece(s)) • Briefing Paper(s) (1-4 pages) (supported by 20-25 page report summarising evidence) • 'Anecdotal evidence', human interest stories	• Significant
Civil servants/ technocrats (in central Government)	• Short face-to-face meetings (formal/ informal) (verbal inputs supported by short research summaries/ Briefing Paper(s)/ Opinion Piece(s)) • Briefing Paper(s) (1-4 pages) (supported by 20-25 page report summarising evidence) • (Some) research reports (departments with research capacity/ technical expertise) • 'Anecdotal evidence', human interest stories • Power-point presentations (supported by Briefing Papers and other research summaries) • Public meetings/ roundtable discussions • Web-based material	• Significant/ variable
Media	• Short face-to-face meetings (informal/ interview) (verbal inputs supported by short research summaries/ Briefing Paper(s)/ Opinion Piece(s)) • Press release or opinion piece supported by briefing paper(s) • Web-based material	• Variable (dependent partly on nature of the state, degree of populism of government, size of parliamentary majority of government etc.)
Civil society organisations	• Short face-to-face meetings (formal/ informal) (verbal inputs supported by short research summaries/ Briefing Paper(s)/ Opinion Piece(s)) • Briefing Paper(s) (1-4 pages) (supported by 20-25 page report summarising evidence) • Research reports (organisations with research capacity, technical expertise) • 'Anecdotal evidence', human interest stories • Power-point presentations (supported by Briefing Papers and other research summaries) • Public meetings/ roundtable discussions	• Variable (dependent partly on nature of the state; openness of key decision-makers to lobbying by civil society; historical relationship between civil society and government and the capacity of civil society.)

	• Web-based material	
General public/ citizens	• Video clips in magazine programmes/ news programmes • Phone-in discussions on the radio • Advertising campaigns (print, radio, TV/ cinema) • 'Celebrity' endorsement of particular issues, and sustained press campaigns • Articles in the national/ local newspapers • Articles in monthly magazines	• Variable, depending on the nature of the state, openness of the media (etc.)
International epistemic community/ academic peers	• Journal article (in well-reputed international, peer reviewed journal) • Books • Edited books • Working papers (in well-reputed series) • Seminars, roundtable discussions	• No direct influence • Influence through stimulating paradigm changes/ shifting the discourse around particular topics/ moving the boundaries of 'permissible thought' and through feeding information and evidence into policy debates through a range of routes

Researchers wishing to feed evidence into policy formation processes need to consider which segment of the policy 'community' they most need to reach and at what point in the policy formation process. They need to consider their audience's preference regarding data sources (e.g. nationally representative household surveys versus ethnographic studies), modes of analysis (statistical analysis presented in the form of graphs and tables or thematic analysis, illustrated by case studies) and presentation (short, bullet pointed summaries or full reporting of findings, supported by complete referencing and methodological notes).

Kanbur has shown that different audiences are likely to be more or less convinced by particular types of evidence and data and are likely to find some arguments more appealing than others. His simple typology divides people into two groups: those who like material that appeals (principally) to their heart and those who prefer material that appeals (principally) to their head. (See Figure 4, see below).

Figure 4: 'The nature of disagreements' within policy processes/spaces'



Source: Developed from ideas presented in Kanbur (2001)

This suggests that Q-squared research is likely to provide a rich source of material for policy influencing, as it will be relatively easy to extract from it data which will appeal to both A and B groups.

4. Contribution of to policy debates

The discussion presented above indicates that where research findings are tailored to the (segmented) audience, they are more likely to be effective. Outputs need to be tailored not only in length (briefing paper versus book chapter), style (academic versus simple English), but also to draw on the audience's likely preference in terms

of data source (qualitative, quantitative or Q-squared) and mode of presentation (extensive or limited use of graphics, statistics, tables and graphs).

A nuanced and differentiated approach to communicating research findings to policy actors is likely to increase the likelihood of 'being heard' and the table below (Table 4) presents an overview of dissemination activities following my Q-squared work in rural Uganda. It highlights that an attempt was made to use a range of different formats including journal articles, book chapters, power-point presentations, blogs and informal conversations to reach a vastly differing audiences, including international academic audiences, bilateral donors and UN representatives and Ugandan policy communities (Ugandan media, civil society, parliamentarians and the general public).

While engaged in this process of dissemination and policy engagement it was clear to me that different audiences do, indeed, prefer different forms of data. Many of the audiences that I interacted with were very happy to see arguments supported and illustrated by life history based case study material, and much of the outputs I produced and the communications activities that I was involved with made heavier use of life history (and other qualitative material) than household survey data. It is likely that other audiences (e.g. Ministries of Finance, World Bank officials) would have preferred to see more quantitative survey analysis, and that this might have added to the perceived legitimacy of the research.

A key shortcoming of this research was that the household survey was designed and implemented by another research team (see footnote 1, for more information about the UEA-led LADDER project) and as a result was not able to demonstrate as much about shocks, coping and poverty trajectories as I might have hoped. 'True' Q-squared research, which sequences and combines qualitative and quantitative research from the research design phase would have been able to over come this, and as you will hear from Bob Baulch and Peter Davies this is what the Chronic Poverty Research Centre is now doing.

4.1. Differentiated 'knowledge products' and effective policy engagement

We know that differentiated knowledge products make for more effective policy engagement, and the table below (Table 4) illustrates an attempt to tailor outputs to the need of different audiences.

Table 4: Differentiating and iterating knowledge products in order to reach a segmented policy community.

What	Focus	Audience	Use of Q-squared data
3 conference papers	1. Drivers and maintainers of poverty and chronic poverty in rural Uganda (Bird, and Shinyekwa, 2003a) 2. (ditto above) (Bird, and Shinyekwa, 2003b) 3. Spatial isolation and poverty in Uganda (Bird, McKay and Shinyekwa, 2007)	• academics/ international epistemic community • civil society organisations,	1. Life histories, triangulated and contextualised with data from focus group discussions and participatory exercises. Some use of household survey analysis. 2. (ditto above) 3. The first two papers used as the starting point for the third. Substantial additional quantitative data collected and analysed to develop a composite index
3 working papers	4. Why issues important to poor people do not get on to policy agendas (Bird et al, 2004a) (annex of case studies, e.g. alcohol dependence, women's access to land, disability) (Bird et al, 2004b) 5. Drivers and maintainers of poverty and chronic poverty in rural Uganda (2003c). 6. Intrahousehold differentiation, with examples from Uganda (Bolt and Bird, 2003)	• academics/ international epistemic community • civil society organisations,	4. The main paper drew on the international political economy literature, but the annex presented a number of case studies drawn from the life history interviews conducted during the Q2 research in Uganda 5. Life histories, triangulated and contextualised with data from focus group discussions and participatory exercises and analysis of key variables from household survey. 6. The paper drew on the international gender analysis literature and applied it to other forms of social difference (preference in polygamous households, birth order etc), illustrated by a number of case studies drawn from the life history interviews conducted during the Q2 research in Uganda
Book chapter	7. Drivers and maintainers of poverty and chronic poverty in rural Uganda, with a focus on shocks, vulnerability and downward mobility (Bird, and Shinyekwa, 2005a)	• academics /international epistemic community	7. Life histories, triangulated and contextualised by data from focus group discussions and participatory exercises. Greater use of household survey analysis than in conference papers and working papers. (As with Bird and Shinyekwa, 2003c above)
Journal article	8. Shocks, vulnerability and downward mobility in rural Uganda (Bird, & Shinyekwa, 2005b)	• academics • international epistemic community	8. Life histories, triangulated and contextualised by data from focus group discussions and participatory exercises. Greater use of household survey analysis than in conference papers and working papers. (As with Bird and Shinyekwa, 2003c above)
2 ID21 Summaries	9. Why are policy responses to the needs of poor people inadequate? (ID21, 2005) 10. Understanding the causes of chronic poverty in Uganda. February 2006. (ID21, 2006)	• policy makers • practitioners • academics /international epistemic community • civil society organisations	9. Provides a short narrative summary of the key findings of Bird et al, 2004a and 2004b (No. 4, above) 10. Provides a short narrative summary of the key findings of Bird and Shinyekwa, 2005b, (No. 8, above)

ODI Blog	11. The marginalisation of poor people from policy agenda setting (Bird, 2005)	• the informed general public • development professionals	11. Provides a very short narrative summary of the key findings of Bird et al, 2004a and 2004b (No. 4, above)
2 Tuesday Trading presentations (internal ODI Seminar)	12. Why issues important to poor people do not get on to policy agendas (based on Bird et al, 2004a and 2004b)[19]. (No. 4) 13. Well-being, shocks, downward mobility and chronic poverty (based on Bird and Shinyekwa 2003a) [20]. (No. 1)	• academics	12. Overview of key political economy findings, with some illustrative case studies based on life history interviews. 13. Thematic analysis of life histories, with some contextual information provided by data from focus group discussions, participative exercises and survey data analysis.
ODI Annual Retreat (2002)	14. Shocks, vulnerability and chronic poverty in rural Uganda[21]	• academics	14. Thematic overview, drawing on life histories, focus group discussions, participative exercises and some survey data.
Commission for Social Development (CSD), UN Parallel Session - UNDESA/HAI/CPRC. (2005). (Organised by HelpAge International.)	15. Why issues important to poor people do not get on to policy agendas: focus on vulnerable older people. New York. 15th February 2005	• UN delegates • donor representatives	16. Presentation illustrated by case studies (based on life histories).
Seminar at EPRC, Makerere University, Uganda. (2003)	16. Downward mobility and chronic poverty in rural Uganda.	• Ugandan academics • NGO representatives • donor representatives	17. Presentation illustrated by case studies (based on life histories).
Training Workshop for Ugandan civil society organisations. (presentation) co-hosted by NGO Forum and Development Research and Training (May, 2005)	17. Presentation focusing strongly on the link between alcohol dependence and poverty.[22]	• Ugandan NGOs	18. Presentation illustrated by highly personalised case studies, based on life histories, including photographs of respondents.
Ugandan Parliamentary Budget Committee &	18. Key findings from the CPRC in Uganda, and their implications for the Ugandan	• Ugandan parliamentarians	19. Oral interventions drawing on key findings from the Q2 work in rural Uganda

[19] Bird, K. (2004) "Fracture Points in Social Policy Formation for Chronic Poverty Reduction." Tuesday Trading. September 2004. London: ODI.
[20] Bird, K. (2003) "Well-being, ill-being and the chronicity of poverty." Tuesday Trading, ODI. December 2003. London: ODI
[21] Bird, K. (2002) "Chronic Poverty in Remote Rural Areas." Presentation at the ODI Annual Retreat.
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Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Roundtable (October 2005)	Parliament.		
Media briefing (Ugandan domestic print media: New Vision, Monitor) (October 2005)	20. Poverty and inequality in Uganda	• Ugandan general public	21. Reporting findings from Q2 work in rural Uganda. Reporting thematic findings from work.

5. Conclusion

This paper has presented q-squared research into chronic poverty in rural Uganda. It has shown that q-squared methods provide rich and robust data, which can be presented in a way that is of interest to a wide range of audiences. The paper has also highlighted the challenges that we face, as researchers, when trying to feed research results into policy processes. These challenges partly relate to the political economy in many low-income developing countries, which mean that issues of interest to poor and chronically poor and marginalised people are unlikely to get onto policy agendas. They are also because policy makers are not necessarily interested in evidence, and often find research-based evidence inaccessible and irrelevant.

These set researchers with a formidable challenge, if we want our research to be relevant. Data from q-squared research possibly increases the likelihood of successful policy influence as it is arguably more robust than data derived from solely quantitative or solely qualitative sources alone and generates information that is capable of being presented to different audiences in different ways: integrated, with both qualitative and quantitative evidence strongly supporting the argument, with a stronger emphasis on statistical and other quantitative data or alternatively with a stronger emphasis on the qualitative, narrative and case study based data.

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