# Figuring Out Accountability: Selected uses of official statistics by civil society to improve public sector performance*

Christopher Scott
London School of Economics and Political Science
Email: C.D.Scott@lse.ac.uk

Q^2	**Q-Squared Working Paper No. 37** **June 2007**

Contents

Acronyms/Glossary

BCV	Bogota, ¿ como vamos ?
BEPER	Municipal Performance Measurement Project (Turkey)
BOT	Build-operate-transfer scheme
CBO	Community based organisation
CSC	Client service charter
CSO	Civil society organisation
EDI	Equity in distribution indicator
GIS	Geographic information system
GPS	Global positioning system
GRAMPTC	Group for Alternative Research and Monitoring of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Project
ICWP	Improved community water point
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Jansunwai	Local public hearing (India)
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies (Tanzania)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEJN	Malawi Economic Justice Network
MKSS	Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangthan (Rajasthan)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODAC	Open Democracy Advice Centre (South Africa)
Panchayat	Village council (India)
PETS	Public expenditure tracking survey
PFCMC	Public Financial Management and Control Act (Turkey)
PIII	Public Institutions Integrity Index (Transparency International-Colombia)
PO-PSM	President's Office Public Service Management (Tanzania)
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit (World Bank)
PSAM	Public Service Accountability Monitor (South Africa)
PSRP	Public Service Reform Programme (Tanzania)
PTA	Parent-teachers association
RTI	Right to information
SDS	Service delivery survey (Tanzania)
SDDS	Special Data Dissemination Standard (IMF)
SIMCE	System for the Measurement of Educational Quality (Chile)
SRC	School report card
SWIN	Social Watch International Network
TAA	Traditional authority area (Malawi)
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TEHIP	Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project
TI	Transparency International
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Executive Summary

- The aim of this paper is to explore by means of selected case-studies how official statistics have been used by civil society organizations to hold public agencies accountable for service delivery or for the effective use of public resources. It does not claim to be a comprehensive study of the use by CSOs of official statistics to monitor public sector performance.

- The report has three distinguishing features: (i) the focus is on recent initiatives and what can be learnt from them; (ii) an accountability matrix is developed to provide a framework for presenting the case-studies, and (iii) several case-studies were selected as pairs with a common theme which allows the experiences of each member of the pair to be compared and contrasted.

- The methodological contributions of the paper are (i) to distinguish between bottom-up and top-down forms of vertical accountability in the public sector, and between three types of societal accountability; (ii) to classify CSOs according to the depth of their statistical analysis and the level of spatial aggregation at which they operate, and (iii) to summarise and integrate all these analytical elements into a single accountability matrix.

- The material reviewed in this report suggests several lessons regarding the use of official statistics by CSOs for accountability purposes. Where national or local governments are committed to increasing the accountability of the public sector to citizens, it may be necessary to create new institutions and/or pass new legislation in order to raise the demand for data. Without the establishment of parents' councils in Parana, it is unlikely that the information generated by the school report cards would have fed into the policy process at local and state level. The passage of the Promotion of Access to Information Act in South Africa has prompted a large increase in demand for data by civil society.

- The use of official statistics by civil society organisations does not need to involve sophisticated analysis, nor require complex technology, in order to increase the accountability of those using public resources. PETS in Uganda and social audits in India have had a large impact on government performance merely by comparing publicly two sets of figures.

- Where citizens are offered a choice in service delivery, this stimulates demand for regular, accurate, timely, relevant and credible statistics on outcomes. The introduction of a national system of education vouchers in Chile has led to a sustained demand for test score data by households across the income distribution.

- In several instances, CSOs have added significant 'accountability value' to official statistics by combining these data with quantitative and/or qualitative information they have collected themselves. BCV complements its analysis of local authority statistics with the results of its annual opinion poll of citizens. WaterAid developed the EDI using Population Census data, GPS information and the results of its own improved community water point survey. The Colombian chapter of Transparency International developed its Public Institutions Integrity Index by combining official data which public agencies are obliged to provide, with its own

information on how well these agencies meet the standards set by the law. Therefore, it is useful if those charged with the collection of official statistics are informed about the methodologies of data gathering by CSOs, and vice-versa. It is important that both sides maintain a positive dialogue in order to exploit opportunities for synergy.

- Developing an information system with official statistics and providing a supporting institutional environment to promote dialogue between citizen-users and government-producers of data is not the exclusive preserve of non-profit organisations in civil society. The BCV example demonstrates that a media company which invests in a project to promote societal accountability at the city level may find that it is also good for its newspaper and TV businesses.

- The BCV case also demonstrates how an increase in the demand for official statistics at the local level can improve the quality of data. As the number of users rose, so more and more questions were raised about the methodology and sources of the data. This revealed the strengths and weaknesses of particular series, encouraged more dialogue between producers and consumers of data, and led to improvements in data quality over time.

- Some innovations in the use of official data, such as the public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) in Uganda, the social audits pioneered by MKSS in India, and the pilot schemes of the Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project (TEHIP) have a quick pay-off. Other initiatives, particularly those requiring significant behavioural changes by stakeholders, may take longer to have an impact on welfare outcomes. Therefore, it is important that such initiatives be sustained long enough for a proper evaluation to be conducted. School record cards in Paraná were discontinued before their long-run effects on learning outcomes could be observed.

- If central government launches an initiative which requires local authorities to master data management skills to meet the demands of civil society, then it is important that local governments receive technical and financial support from central government to acquire and practice these skills. This is illustrated by the experience of the BEPER project in Turkey.

- In principle, the introduction of client service charters in Tanzania is a positive development because CSCs set transparent standards of service delivery which provide the basis for holding public agencies to account. In practice, there is no evidence to date that the charters have improved public sector performance, as measured by the timeliness of service delivery. Three conditions are necessary for CSCs to have a greater impact: (i) information about the charters needs to be more widely disseminated in the local language(s); (ii) citizens and CSOs need to use the charters more vigorously; and (iii) politicians and public officials must be made more responsive to any failures to meet charter standards.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explore selectively how official statistics have been used by civil society organizations to hold public agencies accountable for service delivery and/or for the effective use of public resources. The analysis draws on case studies that illustrate (i) different ways in which official statistics have been used for evidence-based advocacy by civil society organizations; and (ii) different sets of circumstances under which data were collected and made accessible to civil society.

The report has three features. Firstly, the focus is on recent initiatives and what can be learnt from them. Secondly, in order to provide a framework for presenting the case-studies, an accountability matrix is constructed which summarises and integrates the main analytical elements used in the report. Thirdly, six of the case-studies were selected as three pairs, each with a common theme. This allows the experiences of each member of the pair to be compared and contrasted.

Section 2 outlines a simple analytical framework which identifies three attributes of accountability and distinguishes between vertical and horizontal accountability. Civil society organisations (CSOs) are extremely diverse, so it is useful to group them by their respective target audiences which demand different depths of statistical analysis in their assessment of public sector performance. Furthermore, certain types of official data are designed to be used, and can only be used, at certain levels of aggregation. Other types of official information are not so restricted. Such differences need to be incorporated into the framework which is summarised in an accountability matrix.

Section 3 examines the use of social audits and whistle blowing to combat corruption in Uganda, India and South Africa. Section 4 compares the use of pupils' test scores to hold schools to account in two contrasting institutional environments: the Brazilian state of Parana from 1999 to 2002, and Chile since 1987. Section 5 compares the use by CSOs of local authority statistics held on computerised data bases in two countries: Colombia since 1998 and Turkey since 2002. Section 6 examines two cases where CSOs have combined official statistics with their own data to produce novel indices that promote accountability of governments and public sector organisations. WaterAid has introduced the Equity in Distribution Indicator, while the Colombian chapter of Transparency International has developed a Public Institutions Integrity Index. Section 7 reviews Tanzania's experience with client service charters since 2000. Section 8 concludes by drawing some lessons from the case-studies.

2. Analytical framework

2.1. What is accountability ?

Accountability is a relationship between a set of rights-holders with valid claims (principals), who delegate certain tasks and transfer resources to a set of duty-bearers with corresponding obligations (agents). Lawson and Rakner (2005:9-11) distinguish three attributes of accountability under democratic governance[1]:

- *Transparency* requires that citizens are fully informed as to how and why public policy decisions are taken. Understanding how decisions are made requires information about the procedures followed and the criteria used by policy-makers to reach decisions. Understanding why decisions are made requires disclosure of the information drawn on by policy-makers and revelation of the arguments adduced in favour and against particular decisions.
- *Answerability* is the requirement that policy-makers justify their decisions publicly by defending their choice of policies in the face of questioning by Parliamentarians, the media and private citizens. The ultimate form of answerability is the obligation of citizens' political representatives to compete against challengers in regular elections.
- *Controllability* is embodied in institutional mechanisms (checks and balances) designed to prevent, or if prevention fails, to punish public agencies or office holders from violating constitutional procedures, exceeding their mandate or performing poorly.

Accountability relationships exist in several dimensions. The conventional notion of vertical accountability refers to processes where citizens and secondary associations hold policy makers to account directly. These 'bottom up' processes include electoral accountability through which citizens periodically choose their political representatives, and societal accountability by means of which civil society organisations and the media continuously monitor, evaluate and constrain the actions of government between elections. Societal accountability generally complements electoral accountability. However, in circumstances where elections are absent or fail to be free and fair, CSOs may play a quasi-representative role and attempt to substitute for electoral accountability.

An important mechanism of vertical societal accountability exists where the state offers citizens a choice between different units of service delivery. Under a system of education vouchers, such as that operating in Chile, parents may choose between private and state schools, and among state schools. In this case, accountability is achieved by means of a direct transaction between buyer and seller which is the result of consumers exercising choice in the market for educational services[2].

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[1] This section borrows from Lawson and Rakner, but develops their ideas in three ways:
- The market is introduced as an additional mechanism of societal accountability.
- Hierarchical or administrative accountability is included as another form of vertical accountability.
- Two forms of societal accountability are distinguished: complements and substitutes.

[2] See section 4.2.

In the last form of vertical accountability, it is those at the bottom who are accountable to those at the top, rather than vice-versa. Hierarchical or administrative accountability is a characteristic of virtually all large organisations whether public or private. Employees at lower levels of the hierarchy are responsible (accountable) to employees at higher levels[3]. It is important to acknowledge this type of 'top down' vertical accountability because on occasions civil servants may be caught between the conflicting demands of administrative accountability, 'bottom-up' vertical accountability and horizontal accountability. Where education reforms lead to the introduction of school report cards, teachers may be subject to accountability pressures in opposing directions: upwards to Ministry of Education officials and downwards to parents of pupils[4]. A public sector employee whose denunciations of corrupt practices in her organisation using designated channels of vertical administrative accountability are regularly blocked, may turn out of frustration to whistle blowing in order to trigger the use of societal and/or intra-governmental mechanisms of horizontal accountability[5].

Horizontal accountability refers to processes where citizens hold policy makers to account indirectly. Thus, it includes control mechanisms between the different branches of government (legislature, executive and judiciary), as well as within each branch. The activities of other agents of restraint on government such as the Auditor and Controller General, the National Audit Office and ombudsmen are also considered to be manifestations of horizontal accountability.

In addition to these intra-governmental mechanisms, there exist non-governmental or societal processes of horizontal accountability. These may complement or substitute for control devices between the different branches of government. When a CSO publishes a pamphlet which explains in simple terms how the national budget is formulated and how the Treasury's system of public financial management works, and then follows up by presenting the material to a Parliamentary committee, the capacity of the legislature to oversee the executive branch of government is enhanced[6]. This is an illustration of societal horizontal accountability complementing intra-governmental horizontal accountability. By contrast, when the state proves incapable of carrying out a rigorous and transparent audit of public spending, civil society may introduce an institutional innovation at local level to undertake this task. In this case, government failure results in societal horizontal accountability substituting for intra-governmental horizontal accountability[7].

The market offers a third form of societal accountability at the horizontal level. In certain countries, the state assigns to private companies the right to operate parts of the nation's economic and social infrastructure for limited periods of time. At the end of each period, the concession holder may be challenged by competing firms wishing to supply services to this market. If the incumbent has performed poorly, the

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[3] The academic literature appears to subsume relationships between different levels of the administrative hierarchy within a line Ministry, government department or public agency under horizontal accountability which is counter-intuitive.

[4] See section 4.1.

[5] See section 3.3.

[6] These activities are carried out by the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN).

[7] The public hearings organised by the MKSS which are held at the local level in Rajasthan to conduct social audits illustrate this case (see section 3.2).

concession may be re-allocated to another supplier. The granting and withdrawal of concessions is usually the responsibility of a public body, such as a regulatory agency. However, citizens-as-consumers may have a voice in this process through representation on users' consultative committees.

In states which are characterised by a weak oversight capacity of Parliament and high levels of budget support from donors and concessional lenders, external stakeholders may be a strong force exerting horizontal accountability. Missions from international financial organisations have the information, the skills and other resources to ask probing questions of the executive and insist on answers being forthcoming. In some cases, such as the recent scheme established in Chad to track the use of state oil revenues, external stakeholders may insist on a larger role for civil society in monitoring government performance[8]. In other exceptional cases, such as contemporary Palestine, a democratically elected government may face a conflict between accountability to its internal and external stake holders.

The different criteria and dimensions of accountability which are relevant to public service delivery and public sector performance are summarised in Table 1. Examples of different types of accountability are shown in the appropriate cells.

Table 1: Attributes and dimensions of accountability under democratic governance

Dimensions of accountability				Attributes of accountability		
				Transparency	Answerability	Controllability
Vertical	Bottom up	Electoral			Parliamentary elections	
		Societal	Complement	Media interviews with policy-makers	Media interviews with policy-makers	
			Substitute			
			Market	School report cards	School report cards	
	Top down	Hierarchical			Junior official's relationship with his manager in a line Ministry	
Horizontal	Internal	Intra-governmental		-Service level agreement between NSO and institutional users	Public Accounts Committee	Auditor and Controller General
		Societal	Complement	-CSO briefings to Parliamentarians	-CSO briefings to Parliamentarians	-CSO briefings to Parliamentarians
			Substitute	-Social audit -Support to whistleblower in civil service	-Social audit -Support to whistleblower in civil service	-Social audit -Support to whistleblower in civil service
			Market		Citizen-consumers represented on users' committees of a concession	
External				IMF (SDDS)	World Bank (PRSC)	IMF stabilisation programme

2.2. Public services and official statistics

The state funds the delivery of a huge range of services to citizens. These include water and sewerage, waste collection and disposal, transport infrastructure (roads, railways, airports, ports), transport services (buses, trains, aircraft), postal and

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[8] For further details, see the web site of the Group for Alternative Research and Monitoring of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Project (GRAMPTC) at www.gramptc.org

communications services, education and health care, fire and rescue services, regulatory agencies, the police and armed forces, tax and revenue collection and environmental amenities, such as parks and conservation areas. Democratic states also allocate public resources to creating and maintaining an enabling environment for good governance. This requires expenditure on elections, legislature(s), judiciary and the prison service. Many of these services are supplied, as well as funded, by the state. However, it is increasingly common to find private sector providers of services which were previously supplied exclusively by the state. These include firms operating infrastructure projects under build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes and private schools receiving part of their revenue from publicly funded education vouchers.

This report is not a comprehensive study of the use by CSOs of official statistics to monitor public sector performance. Indeed, the difficulties encountered in locating relevant and well-documented case-studies mean that the examples chosen may not be representative of the wide range of services supplied or funded by public agencies.

For present purposes, official statistics include data collected on a regular basis by public agencies through Censuses, surveys, administrative records, National Accounts and satellite observations (particularly Global Positioning System information). Figures produced by once-off, ad hoc initiatives in the public sector are excluded, as are statistics collected by CSOs for use on a 'stand alone' basis[9]. However, the report includes several cases where CSOs have combined the use of self-collected data with official statistics. Note that there may exist more than one official source for a particular statistic and these sources may not be consistent with each other.

2.3. How does civil society use official statistics to promote accountability ?

Civil society organisations (CSOs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in developing countries are extremely diverse with regard to size, objectives, activities, organisational features and sources of funding. They range from small organisations working at community level in a single region of the country using the local language exclusively, to 'think tanks' located in the capital city producing technical publications in English for a national and international readership.

2.3.1. Depth of statistical analysis

As a start, it is useful to differentiate these organisations by their respective target audiences. Different 'publics' have different levels of literacy and numeracy. Hence, the amount of statistical information and the depth of statistical analysis embodied in the products and processes supplied by CSOs varies greatly across target groups. While some CSOs focus on addressing a narrow audience, other CSOs supply several 'publics' and offer a correspondingly wider range of products and processes. It is useful to distinguish four groups of CSOs by the depth and sophistication of their statistical analysis:

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[9] The Sustainability Snapshot, which is a diagnostic tool developed by WaterAid for use at the community level is based entirely on self-collected data. Consequently, it is excluded from this study.

- *Level 1-cursory analysis*: this group undertakes little or no analysis of official statistics. Their activities are concentrated on securing the disclosure of information. Once the requested data are provided (as a result of making use of Right to Information (RTI) legislation or through institutional innovations such as local public hearings), any subsequent analysis does not go much beyond comparing two statistics (planned versus actual expenditures in public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS); administrative records versus data held by individuals in jansunwais). The target audience of this group is often local, eg. a group of villages or urban neighbourhoods, and commonly has low levels of numeracy and literacy. CSO members undertaking these activities require primarily political and legal skills together with expertise in facilitating public meetings.

- *Level 2-descriptive analysis*: this group applies certain techniques drawn from the management and/or participation literature. These include the use of scorecards to evaluate service delivery and examination of the budget process. Quantitative data from official sources are used, but the level of statistical analysis is purely descriptive, ie. calculation of 'averages' (mean, median, mode), preparation of tables and graphs. The target audience of this group is often subnational, eg. municipality, province or state, but is more numerate and literate than that at level 1. It includes some low to middle-ranking policy-makers, and some politicians. CSO members undertaking these activities require some basic analytical skills, an elementary knowledge of statistics and are commonly graduates.

- *Level 3-intermediate analysis*: this group carries out more technical (usually economic) analysis based on survey data, administrative records and/or the Population Census. This includes tax and benefit incidence analysis to assess the distributional impact of fiscal policy, and social cost-benefit analysis to appraise public sector investment projects. CSO work at this level may generate new, policy-relevant indicators with a more rigorous statistical foundation, eg. WaterAid's Equity in Distribution Indicator (EDI)[10]. Data analysis at this level does not provide many opportunities for popular participation. The target audience of this group is English-speaking policy-makers with a graduate level of education. CSO members undertaking these activities are likely to have a post-graduate qualification in a quantitative discipline.

- *Level 4-econometric analysis*: this group undertakes the most rigorous statistical analysis using official data. It includes the creation of spatially disaggregated poverty maps to assess how well anti-poverty programmes are targeted, and the evaluation of policy interventions through the use of counterfactuals. IFPRI's work on poverty mapping in Malawi is an example of the former, while its assessment of PROGRESA in Mexico illustrates the latter. The target audience of this group is English-speaking policy-makers at the highest level, policy analysts and academics. CSO members undertaking these activities generally have a PhD in economics or statistics.

Different levels of statistical analysis serve different purposes which in turn vary across target groups. The report concentrates on CSOs in the second and third groups, ie. those undertaking descriptive and intermediate statistical analysis in support of

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[10] See section 6.1.2.

advocacy work. As per capita incomes grow, numeracy and literacy increases, and democratic governance is consolidated, so the distribution of CSOs across the four groups is likely to change. There will be proportionately fewer organisations operating at levels 1 and 2, and proportionately more at levels 3 and 4.

2.3.2. Levels of spatial aggregation

Certain types of data are designed to be used, and can only be used, at certain levels of aggregation. Household data from a national survey cannot be used at the district/community level because these subsamples are too small to allow valid statistical inference. This was the problem which motivated the development of disaggregated spatial poverty maps which combine survey and Census data. It is also the reason why at certain times countries have chosen (sometimes as a result of heavy donor pressure) to increase greatly the sample size of their household surveys. The sample size of Tanzania's Household Budget Survey in 2000-01 was set exceptionally high at more than 22,000 households in order to permit calculation of regional income poverty estimates.

CSOs use official statistics at many different levels of aggregation:

- *Service delivery unit*: inputs received by and/or the performance of a single school, health clinic or water service point is tracked over time, or compared with other similar units in the area.
- *Village*: administrative data on the existence and/or delivery of a variety of services (education, health, water) may be used if the village is the site of a NGO project.
- *Urban block*: Parivartan, an Indian CSO, organised a public hearing in a low income resettlement colony in Delhi to conduct a social audit of public works allegedly undertaken in the area.
- *District or municipality*: the social audits carried out by the MKSS in Rajasthan take place at public hearings (jansunwais) to which the inhabitants of several villages are invited together with selected local government officials. This level is growing in importance as public service delivery is progressively decentralised in many countries.
- *City*: the 'Bogota, ¿ como vamos ?' project contains a large data base with many indicators measuring different aspects of the economic and social welfare of the citizens of Bogota. This initiative has now been extended to the cities of Medellin, Antioquia, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Cali.
- *Province or department*: Fundacion Corona in Colombia has used data from administrative records and school report cards to assess educational performance in six departments of the country. Transparency International-Colombia has combined information which public agencies are legally required to provide with self-collected data to produce a Public Institutions Integrity Index at departmental level.
- *State*: in large countries with a federal structure such as Brazil, Mexico, China and India, individual states have responsibility for key areas of decision making, eg. land reform in India, and the data bases related to these areas.
- *Nation*: in many countries, the results of most surveys (of households and establishments) are valid only at national level.

- *Public agency*: in certain countries, official statistics are published on the (national) performance of individual public organisations. The Government of Tanzania's website posts the results of service delivery surveys of 27 specific Ministries, Departments or Agencies. Certain international CSOs have conducted regular assessments of public organisations in particular developing countries. Transparency International has calculated its Bribery Index for a range of public and private organisations in Kenya for three successive years (2001-2003).
- *Region (of the world)*: RedEAmerica is a network of CSOs in the Americas which monitors and compares educational performance in different countries of the region.
- *Global*: Social Watch International Network (SWIN) links citizens' groups in sixty countries to monitor progress towards the MDGs and other international goals. SWIN has assembled a wide range of official statistics which are easily accessed via its user-friendly website.

2.4. The accountability matrix

In order to provide a framework for presenting the case-studies, an accountability matrix was constructed which summarises and integrates the main analytical elements discussed in this section of the report (Table 2). The rows of the matrix distinguish between different dimensions (vertical, horizontal) and sub dimensions (complement, substitute, market) of accountability. The sub dimensions are further divided into sets of specific activities undertaken by CSOs in pursuit of different accountability goals.

Some of these activities focus primarily on strengthening one attribute of accountability, such as promoting transparency. The Budget Transparency Index in Latin America developed by the International Budget Project is one such example. Other initiatives shown in Table 2 address all three attributes of accountability simultaneously. The introduction of school report cards and parents' councils in Parana increased the transparency of educational performance in the state, promoted the answerability of teachers and bureaucrats to parents, and enhanced the controllability of teachers and educational policy-makers by parents.

The columns of the matrix distinguish between the different levels of spatial aggregation identified in section 2.3.2. The cells of the matrix contain references to relevant empirical material. Cell entries with shaded text are analysed in this report.

Table 2: The accountability matrix

Dimension	Sub-dimension	Activity	Level of spatial aggregation									
			Service delivery unit	Census enumeration area		District or municipality	City	Province or department	State	Nation	Supra-national	
				Village	Urban block						Regional	Global
Vertical	Complement	Investigate campaign finance								TI-C.Rica,Brazil		
		Monitor Parliamentary activities								Social Watch,India		
		Support/advise private citizens/groups requesting statistics				-ODAC, KwaZulu-Natal						
		Monitor service delivery	-School report cards (Parana)					-School report cards (FCorona, Colombia)	-School report cards (Parana)	- Client Service Charters, Tanzania - Social Watch,India	PREAL	
	Market	Use league tables to choose school for child	SIMCE, Chile							SIMCE, Chile		
Horizontal	Complement	Build Parliamentary capacity								MEJN,Malawi		
		Submit evidence to Judicial Commission						PSAM,E.Cape				
		Monitor e-procurement								-TI-Colombia -Chile Transparente		
		Monitor/assess fiscal performance (inc participatory budgeting, PETS)				-PETS,Uganda -TESEV/Agenda21 BEPER,Turkey	Bogota, ¿como vamos?					
	Substitute	Social audit		-MKSS, Rajasthan	Parivartan Delhi							
		Support whistleblowers						ODAC,N.Cape				
Vertical and Horizontal	Complement	Assess and improve official statistics								WaterAid,Nepal and Tanzania		
		Disseminate official statistics					Bogota, ¿como vamos?					
		Translate, popularise and repackage official statistics								-HakiElimu,Tanzania -HakiKazi, Tanzania		
		Monitor welfare indicators (inc.MDGs)					Bogota, ¿como vamos?					
		Develop new indicators and/or diagnostic techniques using official statistics		Equity in Distribution Indicator (WaterAid, Malawi)		-Public Institutions Integrity Index, TI-Colombia -Transparency Index, TI-Venezuela		-Public Institutions Integrity Index, TI-Colombia		-EDI (WaterAid, Uganda) -Public Institutions Integrity Index, TI-Colombia	Budget Transparency Index, L.A. (IBP)	
	External: complement	Technical policy analysis								IFPRI (PROGRESA, Mexico)		
		In-country election monitoring										
		International comparison/ advocacy of best practice									RedEAmerica	
		Monitor progress towards MDGs										Social Watch/ 3rd World Instit.
		Global advocacy campaign										-Debt relief (Jubilee 2000)
	External: substitute	Monitor human rights								Amnesty International,		

3. Combating corruption through audits and whistle blowing

This section examines several examples of level 1 statistical analysis which focus on securing the disclosure of information. Although the use of data is relatively simple in each case, the impact of these investigations has often been dramatic. The first two examples illustrate different types of audit which use contrasting techniques to compare two statistics which should have the same, or very similar, values. Any large discrepancy between the two figures constitutes strong, but not always incontrovertible, evidence that corruption has taken place.

Public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) compare disaggregated ex ante expenditure figures for public service delivery units, such as schools or health clinics, with the corresponding ex post expenditure figures. Any difference between planned and actual expenditures could be due to delays in transfer payments between central and local government, reallocation of public resources by local government between line items of the budget, or corruption.

Local public hearings compare disaggregated statistics on actual expenditures held in administrative records with data on the same actual expenditures held by individual users or beneficiaries. These social audits are an institutionalised process of verification through corroboration, or falsification through lack of corroboration. In this case, any significant discrepancy between the two figures is almost certainly due to corrupt practice by one or more of the parties concerned.

The last example is whistle blowing which may be defined as 'disclosing information that an employee reasonably believes is evidence of illegality, gross waste, gross mismanagement, abuse of power, or substantial and specific danger to public health or safety' (Devine,1:1997). Thus, whistle blowing involves the public disclosure of private information by an employee in the interests of promoting horizontal accountability. Where the employee works in the private sector, accountability is to the share-holders. Where the employee is a civil servant, accountability is to Parliament and the citizenry at large. In the latter case, the information revealed by the insider is either compared to official data, or stands alone as a challenge to public policy because no official data on the topic has been released, or serves to prompt an investigation into the behaviour of named individuals in particular public agencies.

3.1. Tracking primary education expenditures in Uganda

In the early 1990s, it was believed in Uganda that a prime cause of poor public service delivery was the government's failure to ensure that budgeted funds reached frontline agencies, such as health clinics and schools. However, no management instruments or procedures were available to check whether such leakages occurred. So, the World Bank sponsored a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) in 1996 to establish what proportion of budgeted funds for education and health actually reached their intended destination. In the case of primary education, 250 state schools in 19 districts were surveyed and panel data were collected annually between 1991 and 1995.

The findings showed that over the period, only 13% of the non-wage funds allocated for such items as the purchase of textbooks reached the schools. The remaining 87% either disappeared or was spent by district officials for other purposes. Around 20% of

the resources designated for teachers' salaries was paid to non-existent workers or to persons who were not working as teachers.

The survey revealed that primary school enrolment had risen by 60% between 1991 and 1995, whereas administrative figures indicated that enrolment had remained virtually unchanged. A further surprise was that although all the schools in the survey were in the public sector, nearly three-quarters (73%) of all school spending in 1991 was directly funded by the parents themselves. The findings of the survey were widely disseminated and the government began publicising figures on the transfer of funds to local authorities in the newspapers and on the radio. Each primary school was obliged to post details of the funds which it had been designated in the budget and which it had subsequently received.

This increased flow of public information was the key element in establishing a system of civic monitoring of local government expenditure to reduce corruption and mismanagement. The results of the new system were dramatic and quick in coming. Two follow-up PETS showed that the proportion of non-wage funds reaching the schools had risen from 13% between 1991 and 1995, to between 80% and 90% in 1999 and 2000. With such an impact, the original PETS proved to be highly cost-effective. It took 5-6 months to complete, cost US$60,000 and increased the flow of funds to primary schools by US$18.5 million.

As a result of this experience, the Ugandan government has decided to conduct PETS annually in each basic service sector. If there is a discrepancy between planned and actual spending, then the relevant professional staff (teachers, doctors, nurses) together with local officials and politicians must explain why this situation occurred, defend their decision-making procedures and justify their conduct. Many other countries, including Tanzania, Ghana and Honduras, are now undertaking similar surveys to improve public service delivery.

3.2. Local public hearings (jansunwais) in Rajasthan

The Movement for the Rights of Peasants and Workers (MKSS) in Rajasthan, India has pioneered this type of auditing after successfully lobbying during the 1990s for the passage of a Right to Information Act (RTI) in the state which came into force in 2001. The method used by MKSS at local level is implemented in two stages. Firstly, records are obtained from the government on a particular project or programme. These records are then taken to individual villagers, labourers and other participants in the project to verify whether the figures are correct or not. Secondly, a public hearing is organised to review and make known any discrepancies between the administrative records and the individuals' private information. The hearing is attended by members of one or more villages, while a panel of eminent professionals (lawyers, journalists) is invited to observe the proceedings.

At some hearings, statistics from official measurement books on persons employed, wages paid and work completed on rural public works projects were compared to figures held by those actually employed on these programmes. At other hearings, the records of licensed distributors of subsidised food rations were compared with figures from the ration books of recipients. Audits have also been carried out of hospitals

during which data from medical records were compared with patients' actual experience.

In almost every case, large discrepancies were revealed between the official data held in administrative records and the private information held by individuals. The hearings led to further investigation which in turn disclosed evidence of corruption, embezzlement and maladministration[11]. Nine states in India have passed RTI laws and a national Right to Information Act came into force in October 2005. As a result of this legislation, social audits are becoming increasingly common in both urban and rural areas[12].

This technique of holding local public hearings to enforce accountability has not only spread throughout India, but is also being used in other countries. The Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) in South Africa has taken advantage of the country's Promotion of Access to Information Act to organise hearings in poor fishing communities located on the west coast.

3.3. Whistle blowing in South Africa

Whistle blowers are witnesses whose disclosure of information acts as an early warning system to alert the authorities, the media and the public to danger or illegality[13]. They play a crucial role in safeguarding democratic governance because whistle blowing is often the only way that certain types of malpractice, such as corruption, can be identified. Whistle blowing is a mechanism of horizontal societal accountability which occupies a political space between, and must coexist with, the demands of administrative accountability (which must be met for any organisation to function effectively), and the requirements of the state to ensure secrecy in certain policy areas to protect national security (which is of particular relevance in the contemporary world).

However, the practice is viewed ambivalently in certain quarters where it is associated (wrongly) with organisational disloyalty. Even in those countries, such as the UK and South Africa, where whistle blowing is recognised and protected in law, whistle blowers may be exposed to a range of informal sanctions, including intimidation at work or social ostracism by fellow workers. In other countries lacking Right to Information legislation, the position of whistle blowers is much more precarious. One reason why the practice carries some negative emotive meaning is that certain individuals have sought to use whistle blower protection legislation to pursue personal grievances or to make malicious allegations. For this reason, it is essential that where whistle blowing is recognised and protected in law, institutional procedures exist which are capable of identifying and filtering out abuses of the system.

Precisely because blowing the whistle is an isolated act which requires considerable moral courage if the blower reveals his/her identity, the role of civil society

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[11] For information on the MKSS, visit http://www.freedominfo.org/case/mkss/ or contact the organisation at mkssrajasthan@yahoo.com. Press coverage of MKSS activities has been extensive and includes Deccan Herald (21/9/03) and Mail & Guardian Newspaper, South Africa (20/2/04).

[12] For more information on social audit activities at the national level in India, see the Parivartan website at http://www.parivartan.com/rti.asp .

[13] See FAQs on the Public Concern at Work website at http://www.pcaw.co.uk/faq/individuals.html

organisations in providing information, support and advice to potential and actual whistle blowers is crucial. At present, South Africa is one of the few developing countries with CSOs that have the resources and the skills required to assist whistle blowers. The Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) promotes the fight against corruption by supporting bona fide whistle blowers using the Protected Disclosures Act (PDA) which was passed in 2000. ODAC provides legal advice, support and case referral through a confidential helpline. During 2004, ODAC advised 593 callers on this helpline, wrote a submission on the Protected Disclosures Act, and provided training in support of whistle blowing to the Department of Home Affairs, the City of Cape Town government and the Provincial Government for the Northern Cape. The Centre also published a detailed study of whistle blowing in different parts of the world (Calland and Dehn,2004).

Elsewhere in South Africa, the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) runs a website which tracks progress on cases of corruption and maladministration, some of which may have been initiated by whistle blowers. PSAM recently prepared a written submission to a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into financial mismanagement by the Provincial Government for the Eastern Cape. The submission evaluated the performance of service delivery in four departments (Housing, Health, Education and Welfare) between 2000 and 2004.

4. School test scores, parents' councils and education vouchers

The aim of this section is to show how the same official statistics (school test scores) can be used by civil society in different ways depending on the institutional setting within which accountability is practised. In Parana state, Brazil, school report cards (SRCs) were applied between 1999 and 2002 to collect information on pupils' test scores which were then discussed at parents' councils which were established at school, region and state level. In Chile, pupils have been subject to a cycle of standardised national tests since 1987. Parents make use of this information in some of the same ways as their Brazilian counterparts. However, the existence of an education voucher system means that they have recourse to an additional accountability mechanism, namely to use test scores as one criterion for choosing a school for their children.

4.1. Parana State, Brazil

In Brazil, state governments are responsible for secondary school finance and education delivery, while also overseeing certain aspects of primary education. In December 1998, the governor of Parana appointed Alcyone Vasconcelos Saliba to be State Secretary of Education. She began her period of office by visiting a large number of public secondary schools to talk to headmasters, teachers, pupils and parents. Notwithstanding the existence of parent-teachers associations (PTAs) and a functioning education management information system in every school, she was struck by the low levels of educational quality, extensive ignorance of school performance and widespread complacency regarding academic achievement.

Her strategy for improving learning outcomes at secondary schools had two components. Firstly, after lengthy discussions with stakeholders, a school report card (SRC) was developed. In addition to statistics on fourth and eighth grade test scores,

repetition and drop out rates, class size and teachers' qualifications, the SRC included summary data on parents' opinions about the school's educational quality, parental involvement, information dissemination, and discipline/security issues. The cards also contained data at municipal and state level for most of the key indicators, so that parents and teachers could compare the performance of their school with its neighbours (Box 1). By providing information to stakeholders that was relevant and easily accessible, the school report card improved the supply side of the local market for schooling information and provided a quantitative basis for parents to demand accountability[14].

Secondly, parents' councils were established at school, region and state level to increase parental voice in educational decision-making. This was a crucial complementary reform because it created opportunities for, and incentives to, parents to make use of the information supplied by the school report cards. Gradually, the creation of the councils prompted greater interest from parents in learning outcomes and created political space for them in policy-making which had been dominated hitherto by teachers' unions and civil servants. Thus, this institutional innovation improved the demand side of the local market for schooling information.

This combination of school report cards and parents' councils provided a novel institutional framework for the exercise of vertical societal accountability. The cards provided transparency, while the councils promoted answerability of teachers and policy-makers to parents. Both the cards and the councils enhanced controllability by helping parents to articulate their expectations which were communicated to teachers, and to monitor progress towards achieving them.

Unfortunately, when Secretary Saliba left office at the end of 2002, school report cards were discontinued in Parana by her successor. It is also difficult to assess the impact of this four year experiment on school performance since the state government's website provides no data after 2000. Nevertheless, the state of Sao Paulo has started to use report cards, as has the state of Ceara for all its municipal services (Winkler,2005)[15].

4.2. Chile

Although Chile's earliest initiatives to measure school performance date back to the late 1960s, the current System for the Measurement of Educational Quality (SIMCE) was put in place in 1987[16]. Under this system, standardised annual tests are carried out by the Ministry of Education among all pupils in the country who are at a particular grade. Three grades (4th, 8th and 10th) are selected for testing, so scores are available for a given grade once every three years. Pupils are tested in four areas: Spanish, mathematics, sciences and social affairs. The SIMCE covers all schools, whether public or private, but it does not include a survey of parents' opinions. Publication of test results is keenly awaited each year and league tables are

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[14] In addition to serving as an accountability device, SRCs act as a management tool at the school level and as a driver to wider educational reforms (Winkler,DR and M.Sevilla,2004).

[15] For a wide ranging discussion of the meaning of 'accountability' in Brazilian education, see Brooke (2005).

[16] For further details of the SIMCE, see http://www.simce.cl

constructed in which schools are ranked according to their (mean) SIMCE scores in each subject.

These establishment-specific measures of learning outcomes take on particular significance in the institutional context of the Chilean educational system. In 1981, a wide ranging programme of educational reform was undertaken by the then military government. The management of public schools was devolved from the centralised Ministry of Education to local municipalities. Public school teachers lost their status as civil servants and the right to collective bargaining. At the same time, education vouchers were offered to all pupils to encourage greater competition between (and among) public and private schools in an attempt to improve educational performance. Following Chile's return to democracy in 1990, the voucher scheme was retained, although new legislation introduced greater regulation of the labour market for teachers, particularly in public schools. At present, three types of schools exist in Chile:

- Public (or municipal) schools
- Subsidised private schools participating in the voucher scheme
- Tuition-charging private schools which do not participate in the voucher scheme

In this context, SIMCE data are used in several ways by civil society. Test scores provide additional, independent information to parents on their child's progress and on school performance. Where an establishment's results are poor relative to other similar schools, this provides a tool for parents to demand improvements from teachers. If they remain dissatisfied with their school's performance, then a voucher system should in principle (but not always in practice) allow them to transfer their child from a low performing to a high performing school. Proponents of vouchers see this exercise of choice by parents as the key mechanism for driving up educational standards[17].

For their part, schools (particularly in the subsidised private sector) have been quick to use high SIMCE scores to attract pupils. Box 2 provides an illustration. However, because the best performing schools in both the private and public sector tend to be oversubscribed, they may enjoy some discretion in selecting pupils. This is not the result of education vouchers per se, as several forms of rationing access to good public schools may be observed in situations where vouchers are absent. Nevertheless, the existence of a voucher system may raise excess demand for particular schools, thereby adding to the pool of pupils from which a headmaster can choose. If 'cream skimming' by subsidised private schools in Chile does occur, then public schools face an even greater challenge to improving educational performance owing to the loss of their best pupils.

In terms of accountability, the publication of 'league tables' which rank schools by their average SIMCE scores has increased the transparency of educational outcomes in Chile. This information also provides an instrument for parents to hold teachers answerable not only for the academic performance of their children, but also of their children's school. The combination of publicly available school test scores and an

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[17] The impact of education vouchers on educational outcomes in Chile is a contentious issue. West (1996) takes a favourable view, while others (Carnoy,1997; Carnoy and McEwan,1999; Hsieh and Urquiola,2003) are more sceptical.

education voucher system enhances the controllability of teachers by parents in many schools. This is because the voucher system endows parents with the power to transfer their children from low-performing to high-performing schools.

5. Bottom-up versus top-down accountability in the use of municipal data

This section compares the use by CSOs of local authority data in two countries: Colombia and Turkey. 'Bogota: how are we doing ?' is a private sector initiative to increase accountability of the city government to its citizens. It has developed rapidly since 1998 without outside assistance, and is now firmly established as a political space where urban policy issues relevant to Bogota can be subject to informed debate by civil society. By contrast, the Municipal Performance Measurement Project (BEPER) in Turkey is more recent and more ambitious. Launched by central government in 2002 with external support, the scheme now includes more than 100 local authorities. Civil society's use of this information system is incipient at present, although it has considerable potential.

5.1. Bogota, ¿ como vamos ?

'Bogota: how are we doing ?' (henceforth BCV) is a project launched in 1998 by a private consortium made up of the El Tiempo media organisation, the Bogota Chamber of Commerce, and the Corona Foundation, which is a non-profit organisation founded by the Echavarria family[18]. The initiative emerged during the 1997 mayoral elections in Bogota as a means of checking whether the successful candidate fulfilled his electoral promises. BCV is managed by a board (of four members) which oversees a technical committee (of five members) and a coordinating unit (of two persons). The annual cost of the project is around US $75,000 of which 74% is spent on staff costs of the coordinating unit.

BCV has several objectives, but they are all concerned with increasing the accountability of the local administration to the city's residents by using a combination of quantitative and qualitative information. The project aims to promote greater transparency and efficiency of local government, while also encouraging more informed political participation by citizens. It pursues these goals by monitoring progress in eleven policy areas using indicators of service coverage and service quality which are drawn from official statistics[19]. Much of these data come from administrative records of the city administration which are made available every six months. In addition, BCV records changes in the 'Bogotómetro' which is a monitoring device containing a further 75 variables based on official monthly data[20]. The project complements its use of local government statistics with information it collects itself. BCV conducts an annual opinion survey of Bogota residents on the quality of service delivery and arranges focus group discussions.

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[18] 'El Tiempo' publishes one of the city's highest circulation newspapers and owns the City TV channel.

[19] These areas are economic development, education, public spaces, public finance, public sector management, the environment, civic responsibility, health, citizens' security, housing and related services.

[20] The 'Bogotómetro' includes statistics on crime, traffic accidents, health and the environment as well as cultural, recreational and sporting activities.

In addition to tracking how the quality of life of Bogota citizens changes, and is seen to change over time, BCV assesses the implementation and impact of the local administration's development plan. These assessments together with the results of its other monitoring activities are regularly discussed at meetings which bring together technical experts, local government officials, city councillors and members of the public. All project outputs are widely disseminated through the Bogota section of the 'El Tiempo' newspaper and via the City TV channel.

The impact of BCV has been considerable at local, national and international level. Firstly, the local administration of the city of Bogota has become more accountable to its residents. Before the project began, each outgoing mayor would issue a report simply describing the activities undertaken during his period of office. Now, this report includes statistics of service coverage and quality, while greater emphasis is given to output and outcome indicators.

Secondly, the quality, relevance and timeliness of statistics collected by the local administration has improved. Prior to 1998, the housing department would measure progress by the number of low cost houses constructed. Now, the department uses its estimate of the change in the housing deficit (measured in standard units) as a key outcome indicator.

Thirdly, some agencies in the local administration, such as the education department, now use the results of BCV's annual public opinion survey as indicators in their internal monitoring and evaluation systems. Fourthly, and most recently, project staff have worked with the city's mayor to review and revise all BCV's quality of life indicators, define a new base line for each indicator, and set targets to be achieved by 2008.

The success of this initiative is demonstrated by the number of cities in Colombia and elsewhere which are attempting to replicate BCV. Similar projects are now underway in Barranquilla, Cali, Manizales, Medellin, Antioquia and Cartagena. Outside the country, the scheme has been adopted in Panama and in Ecuador. BCV was awarded UN Habitat's international prize for best practice in improving the quality of life in cities in 2000 and in 2002.

Despite its substantial achievements, BCV continues to face several challenges. Some agencies in the city government continue to have difficulty in measuring outputs and outcomes as well as inputs and activities. The project is also keen to extend its user base beyond newspaper readers and TV audiences. In an attempt to reach lower income groups, there are plans for disseminating BCV outputs by radio. Its success has put its modest resource base under considerable pressure and the project needs more technical and financial support to expand as a demand-driven, policy-relevant information system and as a space for debate.

Overall, BCV has enhanced all three attributes of accountability in urban local government. It was launched in order to demand greater answerability by the mayor to the city's electorate. In this, it has been largely successful, as indicated by the recent agreement with the mayor's staff to define baselines for BCV's performance indicators and to set targets for 2008. The project has also improved transparency by monitoring and publishing indicators of service coverage and service quality in

Bogota. Finally, BCV has increased controllability of local government officials and city councillors through its programme of regular policy meetings which are widely publicised in the press and on television.

5.2. Municipal Performance Measurement Project (BEPER), Turkey

BEPER is an electronic data base accessible via the Internet which covers 129 pilot municipalities in Turkey. It was established between 2002 and 2004 by the General Directorate of Local Authorities within the Ministry of the Interior with World Bank support, and contains 63 municipal performance indicators for infrastructure, public finance and services.

Long-run and short-run factors shaped the emergence of BEPER. The Earth Summit of 1992 issued a comprehensive plan of action to protect the environment (Agenda21) which included a call for local authorities to involve citizens in drafting local Agenda 21s to meet community needs. The UN plan stressed the importance of high quality, relevant and accessible data for decision-making, and highlighted the need to strengthen electronic networking capabilities[21]. The Turkish response to this initiative was gradual, but in 1997 with UNDP support, the local Agenda21 programme was launched in nine cities to strengthen local governance and promote civil society participation in decision-making. After two years, Turkey's experience was identified as the most successful such project in 50 countries, and coverage spread to 48 municipalities and five regional associations of local authorities in 2000. During this period, the Ministry of the Interior passed two decrees to support local Agenda21 processes.

By 2002, fifty local authorities were involved in Agenda21, which was more than half of all the municipalities formally committed to this initiative in the Middle East and North Africa. Each participating city had a local Agenda 21 city council with various stakeholders, including central government agencies. Turkey's experience of local Agenda 21 was deemed best practice and presented at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002). Thus, in the decade prior to the establishment of BEPER, municipalities in Turkey had increasingly mobilised to formulate development plans which reflected local needs and priorities[22].

The key short-run factor which influenced BEPER's creation was the Turkish general election in 2002 which brought a new party to power with a mandate to make public sector management more transparent and accountable to citizens. This political change created new opportunities (which have not yet been fully seized) for evidence-based policy-making at national, provincial and local level.

To date, municipalities have made minimal use of the BEPER indicators for their own management purposes. They tend to view the project as an initiative through which local authorities are to be held accountable to central government rather than to

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[21] See paragraphs 28.2, 40.5 and 40.25 of Agenda 21 (UN:1992).

[22] Another external driver of public sector reform may have been the country's desire to secure a favourable decision by the European Union to allow Turkey to start on the road to full membership.

municipal stakeholders[23]. However, this view is likely to change once the provisions of the Public Financial Management and Control Act (PFCMC) come into force[24]. The PFMC requires the heads of all local administrations to issue annual accountability reports. The BEPER data should prove valuable in assisting local authorities discharge this statutory obligation to their citizens.

Civil society's use of BEPER is also at an early stage. Many NGOs are not yet aware of this information resource. Local Agenda 21 city councils are starting to draw on the data, but only to a very limited extent. The Turkish Economic and Social Studies foundation (TESEV), an independent Istanbul-based think-tank, has an ongoing project to build civil society's capacity to monitor public service delivery through citizen report cards and expenditure tracking. It is using BEPER data to compare actual with planned public expenditure at municipal level. The first results of this work are due in July 2006.

This new information system is not without weaknesses. Concerns have been expressed about the quality of data which are inputted by municipal officials without being checked. One safeguard of data quality in this context is to increase the demand for statistics at the local level. As the number of users rises, so more and more questions will be raised about the methodology and sources of the data. This will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of particular series, encourage more dialogue between producers and consumers of data, and lead to improvements in data quality over time. This is precisely the dynamic unleashed by BCV which has generated better local authority statistics in Bogota. Thus, there is a strong argument for prioritising efforts to raise the technical and institutional capacity of local stakeholders to use BEPER data because this will not only increase the demand for official statistics, but will also improve their quality and credibility in the long run.

It is too early to assess the impact of BEPER on service delivery at the municipal level in Turkey. Nevertheless, there is evidence that this project is starting to contribute to greater accountability of local government. As the Public Financial Management and Control Act is implemented, so the value of BEPER will be increasingly recognised by civil society as a resource for demanding greater answerability by local officials. The existence of this data base gives local authorities no excuse for not discharging their statutory obligation to issue annual accountability reports under the PFMC. The use of information from BEPER by TESEV to track public expenditures at municipal level also promises to enhance transparency and controllability of local government. Overall, BEPER is an interesting initiative which has the potential to empower citizens by using modern information and communications technology. This is a necessary first step in a long process of transforming the country's public sector management culture and practices.

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[23] There is some truth in this view. When current legislation is fully implemented, 10% of central government transfers to municipalities will be determined by the value of BEPER performance indicators. Better performing municipalities will receive more funds.

[24] The Public Financial Management and Control Act was passed in December 2003.

6. From assessing statistics to a statistical assessment: WaterAid and Transparency International

This section examines two cases where CSOs have combined official statistics with their own data to produce novel indices that promote accountability of governments and public sector organisations.

6.1. WaterAid (Malawi) and the Equity in Distribution Indicator (EDI)

Access to fresh water is a fundamental requirement of human life. Access to safe drinking water is a precondition for sustained improvements in health, particularly that of babies and young children. WaterAid is a UK-based non-governmental organisation which implements integrated water, sanitation and hygiene education projects in fifteen African and Asian countries. It works in partnership with local organisations, mostly at the community level, but also pursues an advocacy agenda on water policy issues at national and international level. WaterAid holds governments to account for the quality and management of sectoral statistics, and uses official statistics to evaluate public investment decisions taken in water and sanitation.

6.1.1. Assessment of sectoral statistics

Diagnostic work in Tanzania, Nepal and other countries by WaterAid has shown that public information on water and sanitation is highly fragmented. Different organisations collect figures in different ways for different purposes which generates data inconsistencies. This is aggravated by a lack of earmarked funding for producing statistics in some instances. Poor coordination among agencies leads to duplication of effort and to data gaps. These weaknesses make it difficult to use sectoral statistics as a basis for policy, while also inspiring little confidence in routine official figures which purport to measure actual service delivery. Consequently, such information as is available on water and sanitation is often under-utilised (Sugden, 2003a).

These assessments of sectoral statistics have been used by WaterAid to suggest improvements to countries' water and sanitation information systems. Their recommendations include closer institutional coordination to agree indicators, integrate systems, and consolidate data bases at national level; capacity building among users and collectors of data; and the introduction of robust verification procedures (down to village level). Several countries, including Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Uganda and Nepal have started to review and revise their sectoral statistics as a result (ODI, 2004).

6.1.2. The EDI as an investment criterion

Water Aid has also combined the use of official statistics with its own data to engage in advocacy over public investment decisions. In Tanzania, information from the Household Budget Survey (2000-01) was used to analyse how access to improved water sources varied across the income distribution (de Waal, 2003). It was found that the percentage of households using piped water increased monotonically with the level of income, while the proportion using protected water sources (enclosed wells or springs) remained roughly constant across the income distribution. From this

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evidence, it was concluded that the marginal benefit incidence of public spending on protected water sources was more pro-poor than investing in piped water[25].

Then, statistics drawn from the National Budget, donor financed programmes and Water Aid's own projects were used to calculate the annualised per capita costs of piped and protected water schemes, and to estimate the rehabilitation costs of piped systems in different areas of the country. This analysis provided the evidence base for proposing four region-specific water development strategies[26]. A common feature of several strategies was to reallocate public funds from piped water schemes to projects which protect water sources.

In Malawi, WaterAid followed up its assessment of sectoral statistics by combining data from the Population Census, the Global Positioning System (GPS) and its own improved community water point (ICWP) survey to develop an Equity in Distribution Indicator (EDI) (Sugden, 2003b). The purpose of the survey was to establish the age, provider, condition and location of each improved water point in a community. Every point was visited and its precise location determined by the use of a handheld GPS device. The survey results were entered into a data base which allowed a water point map to be created by using Geographic Information System (GIS) technology.

Then, information from the 1998 Population Census was used to calculate the water point densities (number of water points per 1,000 people) of each census enumeration area, traditional authority area and district. The Equity in Distribution Indicator for a traditional authority area (TAA) is computed by summing the absolute value of the differences in water point densities of each census enumeration area from the mean density of the TAA, and dividing by the number of census enumeration areas. The higher the value of the EDI, the more unequally distributed are the improved community water points in the traditional authority area[27].

WaterAid argues that the EDI can be used for both positive and normative purposes. As a monitoring indicator, it can show whether water investment at district, regional or national level has increased or reduced inequality of access to improved community water points over time. As an investment criterion, it suggests the following implicit procedure for allocating a budget of given size:

- Rank all areas according to the value of their EDI.
- Target all investment initially on the area with the highest value of the EDI (call this area 1)
- When the EDI of area 1 falls to the value of the EDI in the second highest area (area 2), allocate investment to areas 1 and 2 while ensuring the EDI remains equal in the two areas.

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[25] Neither average nor marginal benefits of public spending on water were explicitly calculated.

[26] Regions were classified into four groups with each group having a specific strategy.

[27] The EDI is equivalent to the mean absolute deviation which is given by $\dfrac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left|X_i - \overline{X}\right|$, where

X_i = water point density of ith census enumeration area, $\overline{X}$ = mean water point density of the traditional authority area, and n = number of census enumeration areas in the TAA.

- When the EDI of areas 1 and 2 falls to the value of the EDI in the third highest area (area 3), allocate investment to areas 1, 2 and 3 while ensuring the EDI remains equal in the three areas.
- Continue this sequence until the investment budget is exhausted[28].

WaterAid is advocating the use of the EDI to ensure that the MDG relating to water is met at national, regional and local level by 2015. The indicator provides a basis for costing this MDG and allows civil society to check whether the government is investing enough in appropriate technologies in the right locations. The EDI has been included as an indicator in Uganda's Water and Sanitation Sector performance Monitoring Framework since 2004 and is likely to be adopted by other governments in the region[29].

Whether the EDI will actually be used to disseminate information on access to water, or to guide investment decisions, will depend on whether certain political economy constraints on evidence-based policy-making in the sector can be overcome. Civil servants are under pressure from politicians to demonstrate improvements in service coverage and delivery which poses a continual challenge to the integrity and transparency of water and sanitation statistics.

Politicians, in turn, are under pressure from their electors to improve water access. Incumbents and challengers often compete over promises to sink additional boreholes in a constituency. Delivering on these promises after the election can lead to politically-driven investment decisions in water and sanitation which may be inconsistent with a strategy designed to reduce the value of the country's overall Equity in Distribution Indicator.

Overall, WaterAid's work has strengthened all three attributes of political accountability. Their recommendations for improving countries' water and sanitation information systems promotes transparency, as does the introduction of the Equity in Distribution Indicator which shows whether water investment at district, regional or national level has increased or reduced inequality of access to improved community water points over time. The EDI also enhances answerability and controllability by serving as a tool for civil society to challenge politically-driven investment decisions in water and sanitation.

6.2. Transparency International and the Public Institutions Integrity Index in Colombia

The second example of a hybrid indicator which is constructed from official statistics and information collected directly by a CSO is the Public Institutions Integrity Index (PIII) developed by the Colombian chapter of Transparency International (TI). The

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[28] It is unclear how the spatio-temporal allocation of water investment using EDI would differ from that using a conventional social-cost benefit criterion such as the Net Present Value or Internal Rate of Return. The area rankings produced by the two criteria are likely to be similar under two conditions:
- If the marginal costs of improving access to protected water sources vary little across areas.
- If a £1 private benefit from improving water access in a high EDI area is valued socially at more than £1, and a £1 private benefit from improving water access in a low EDI area is valued socially at less than £1.

[29] Personal communication, Belinda Calaguas, WaterAid, 18/1/06.

PIII measures three aspects of a public sector organisation's integrity which is defined as its vulnerability to corruption[30]:

- Transparency: this includes how the organisation deals with complaints, what accountability mechanisms exist to the public and how (if at all) public feedback has led to changes in organisational behaviour.
- Investigation and sanctions: this measures an organisation's capacity to investigate wrongdoing and its willingness to enforce internal discipline through applying sanctions to individuals.
- Institutionality and efficiency: this measures the extent to which behaviour in an organisation is consistent with prescribed procedural norms.

The index was first constructed at national level in 2002. It has been updated annually ever since, but the original methodology has changed in several ways[31]. The PIII was calculated for all 32 departments in 2003-04 and 2004-05, and was extended to the country's 1094 municipalities in 2005.

This index was developed to achieve several objectives. Firstly, TI wished to create greater awareness about corruption among the general public and to make proposals for how to reduce it. Secondly, TI was keen to provide a tool which public sector managers could use to enhance the integrity of their own organisations. For this reason, TI has gone to great lengths to secure the cooperation of participating organisations and to persuade all those involved that the process of constructing the index is a collaborative exercise aimed at improving institutional performance.

The data used to construct the Public Institutions Integrity Index are derived from three sources. Firstly, certain facts and figures, such as those relating to procurement practices, are (or should be) available on the organisation's website. Secondly, specified information relating to each organisation's administrative procedures (tramites) and management control systems must be registered with certain government departments. These public sector sources which are external to the organisation include the Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, and the Contraloría de la Nación. Thirdly, TI collects information directly from each participating organisation by means of a special questionnaire. This instrument covers all three dimensions of integrity (Transparency, Investigation and Sanctions, Institutionality and Efficiency) and is used to create a variety of objective indicators[32]. Further details on which information is derived from which sources is given in Box 3.

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[30] Note that this index does not purport to measure the incidence of corruption, merely the extent to which an organisation is at risk of corrupt practices.

[31] In 2002, the PIII was calculated for 88 entities. Coverage increased to 146 organisations in 2003 and to 182 organisations in 2004. This last figure represented 80% of the executive branch of central government and 100% of the legislative and judicial branches.

[32] Prior to 2004, the PIII was partly based on subjective information provided by an organisation's staff. Since 2004, these data on employees' perceptions have been separated out to form an Index of Institutional Performance (Indice de Desempeño Institucional) and responsibility for collecting these data and constructing this index has passed to the National Statistical Office (DANE).

TI uses a complex methodology to construct the index[33]. Each of the three dimensions of integrity is assigned a set of indicators. Transparency has eight, Investigation and sanctions has three, and Institutionality and Efficiency has nine. Each indicator is measured by several variables and each variable has a maximum value it can take which is measured by a number of points. Points are aggregated across variables to give a value for each indicator, and indicator values are summed to provide a score for each dimension of integrity. The overall value of the Public Institutions Integrity Index is the weighted mean of points across the three dimensions of integrity[34]. This value is normalised to lie between zero (lowest integrity or highest risk of corruption) and 100 (highest integrity or lowest risk of corruption). Cluster analysis is then used to segment the organisations into five groups according to the risk of corruption.

The development of the Public Institutions Integrity Index has had a significant impact in Colombia and beyond. It has raised public awareness of corruption in the country and, together with TI Colombia's other outputs, has helped create important synergies with other CSOs working to promote accountability in the public and private sectors[35]. More than thirty such organisations are now supported by TI Colombia to enhance social control of the state. A website established by TI to disseminate information to the electorate during Presidential elections in 2002 and local elections in 2003 received more than 90,000 hits. Work related to the index has also prompted legislation to improve methods of public procurement. Decree 2170 passed in 2002 incorporates several proposals put forward by TI Colombia.

Overall, the Public Institutions Integrity Index has enhanced all three attributes of accountability in Colombia. Its major impact has been to promote transparency at national, departmental and municipal level. However, citizens are also better placed to demand answerability from elected representatives and government officials alike as a result of being better informed about the performance of public sector organisations. Finally, now that the vast majority of state entities have voluntarily agreed to participate in the annual exercise of supplying information for the PIII, social controllability of these organisations has increased.

7. Public service delivery as a social contract: client service charters in Tanzania

A client service charter (CSC) is a social contract between a public service provider, which may be a Ministry, Department or Executive Agency, and its users. It specifies standards of service delivery in the form of a set of commitments by the provider and provides rights of redress to users if these standards are not met. Charters were introduced in Tanzania as an integral part of a wide ranging programme of public service reform (PSRP) which was inaugurated in 2000. Their purpose is to assign rights to service users and to improve service delivery through monitoring progress

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[33] Further details on the methodology of the PIII can be found at
http://www.transparenciacolombia.org.co/new//transparencia/publico/indicedeintegridad/resultadosnacional20032004.html

[34] The weights are determined by the number of indicators in each dimension of integrity, so Transparency has a weight of 40%, Investigation and Sanctions has a weight of 15%, and Institutionality and Efficiency has a weight of 45%.

[35] TI Colombia's founding Executive Director, Rosa Inés Ospina Robledo, retired from this position in 2006. She was replaced by Margareth Flórez who had been Subdirector of Programmes at the Corona Foundation which co-sponsors the 'Bogota, ¿ como vamos ?' initiative (see section 5.1).

towards achieving targets. Most services provided by a given supplier are included in a CSC, but charter implementation to date is monitored only with respect to the timeliness of service delivery (Government of Tanzania, 2004).

Monitoring progress towards the achievement of CSC commitments is overseen by the President's Office Public Service Management (PO-PSM). The main instrument used for this purpose is the annual service delivery survey (SDS) which covers all MDAs with charters. Survey data are preferred to administrative records which are often unavailable, unreliable or prohibitively expensive to collect. The survey questionnaire includes sections on policy perceptions (are respondents well informed about a Ministry's development plan and its CSC ?), service delivery options (are respondents willing to pay for particular services ?) and actual performance (as measured by the time taken to deliver those services having a commitment value included in the charter). Responsibility for undertaking these surveys is contracted out by PO-PSM to private firms and independent research centres. The survey results for each MDA are posted on the government website, while PO-PSM also produces a summary report.

Are CSCs being used by civil society to hold MDAs to account for service delivery ? They are used to some extent, but not as widely as they might be. Many people, particularly in rural areas, are not well informed about the charters. Low levels of functional literacy and numeracy are one barrier to understanding and use. This problem is aggravated by the small amount of charter-related material available in Kiswahili on the government website. The government has responded to such criticism by suggesting that certain CSOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) should be encouraged and supported to assume advocacy roles for clients in specific service delivery areas[36]. However, on certain occasions when these organisations have fulfilled precisely this role, the government's response has been hostile. There may also be deeper cultural reasons, related to the country's hierarchical and patriarchal traditions, which inhibit public service users from expressing their dissatisfaction directly rather than through an intermediary (Kelsall et al, 2005). Thus, citizens are at a very early stage of learning how to use CSCs as they were designed to be used.

Has the introduction of client service charters improved service delivery ? It is probably too early to say. However, this question cannot be answered satisfactorily without specifying a counterfactual which estimates what service delivery for each MDA would have been in the absence of CSCs. Such an evaluation has not yet been carried out and would be difficult to carry out. One study by PO-PSM used administrative data to examine performance across 72 service delivery commitments in a sample of five Ministries/Departments and two Executive Agencies over a three year period (2001-2003). It concluded that '..the drafting of Client Service Charters has not positively impacted on service delivery timeliness' (Government of Tanzania, 2004: 2-1). However, this study suffers from several methodological weaknesses, which makes such a bold conclusion unduly harsh[37].

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[36] 1st Annual National Conference on Public Sector Reforms, October 2004.

[37] Given the methodology adopted by this study, such a conclusion is not supported by the evidence for at least four reasons:

- Since the results are derived from a sample, any estimate (such as the proportion of fulfilled commitments) is subject to sampling error. The report does not provide confidence intervals for the

In conclusion, CSCs have the potential to enhance all three attributes of political accountability in Tanzania. Transparency is promoted by specifying standards of service delivery by the provider and by establishing rights of redress to users if these standards are not met. Both answerability and controllability will be strengthened once users and civil society organisations have learnt how to use the charters more vigorously. However, CSCs are only likely to have a significant positive effect on service delivery in the long run if they complement, rather than substitute for, robust efforts to strengthen other accountability mechanisms. Client Service Charters form an integral part of a broader programme of public service reform which has brought, and continues to bring, benefits to the country's citizens.

8. Lessons from the case-studies

The material reviewed in this report suggests several lessons regarding the use of official statistics by CSOs for accountability purposes:

- Where national or local governments are committed to increasing the accountability of the public sector to citizens, it may be necessary to create new institutions and/or pass new legislation in order to raise the demand for data. Without the establishment of parents' councils in Parana, it is unlikely that the information generated by the school report cards would have fed into the policy process at local and state level. The passage of the Promotion of Access to Information Act in South Africa has prompted a large increase in demand for data by civil society.

- The use of official statistics by civil society organisations does not need to involve sophisticated analysis, nor require complex technology, in order to increase the accountability of those using public resources. PETS in Uganda and social audits in India have had a large impact on government performance merely by comparing publicly two sets of figures.

- Where citizens are offered a choice in service delivery, this stimulates demand for regular, accurate, timely, relevant and credible statistics on outcomes. The introduction of a national system of education vouchers in Chile has led to a sustained demand for test score data by households across the income distribution.

- In several instances, CSOs have added significant 'accountability value' to official statistics by combining these data with quantitative and/or qualitative information

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pre- and post-CSC estimates, so it is unclear whether a difference of four percentage points is statistically significant or not.
- It is quite possible that the post-CSC estimate of 60% of commitments being met is actually higher than it would have been if the charters had not been introduced. A simple comparison of 'before' and 'after' values of this indicator does not allow any conclusions to be drawn regarding causality.
- The pre-CSC value of 64% is likely to have been a long-run or steady-state value reflecting the incentives and ethos of the pre-reform civil service. By contrast, the post-CSC value is a short-run value which is likely to increase once the full implications of the charters are understood and internalised by MDAs' staff.
- It seems inconsistent for PO-PSM to reject the use of administrative data as the basis for annual performance assessments of MDAs, yet to rely exclusively on these data to appraise the impact on service delivery of introducing client service charters.

they have collected themselves. BCV complements its analysis of local authority statistics with the results of its annual opinion poll of citizens. WaterAid developed the EDI using Population Census data, GPS information and the results of its own improved community water point survey. The Colombian chapter of Transparency International developed its Public Institutions Integrity Index by combining official data which public agencies are obliged to provide, with its own information on how well these agencies meet the standards set by the law. Therefore, it is useful if those charged with the collection of official statistics are informed about the methodologies of data gathering by CSOs, and vice-versa. It is important that both sides maintain a positive dialogue in order to exploit opportunities for synergy.

- Developing an information system with official statistics and providing a supporting institutional environment to promote dialogue between citizen-users and government-producers of data is not the exclusive preserve of non-profit organisations in civil society. The BCV example demonstrates that a media company which invests in a project to promote societal accountability at the city level may find that it is also good for its newspaper and TV businesses.

- The BCV case also demonstrates how an increase in the demand for official statistics at the local level can improve the quality of data. As the number of users rose, so more and more questions were raised about the methodology and sources of the data. This revealed the strengths and weaknesses of particular series, encouraged more dialogue between producers and consumers of data, and led to improvements in data quality over time.

- Some innovations in the use of official data, such as the public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) in Uganda, the social audits pioneered by MKSS in India, and the pilot schemes of the Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project (TEHIP) have a quick pay-off. Other initiatives, particularly those requiring significant behavioural changes by stakeholders, may take longer to have an impact on welfare outcomes. Therefore, it is important that such initiatives be sustained long enough for a proper evaluation to be conducted. School record cards in Paraná were discontinued before their long-run effects on learning outcomes could be observed.

- If central government launches an initiative which requires local authorities to master data management skills to meet the demands of civil society, then it is important that local governments receive technical and financial support from central government to acquire and practice these skills. This is illustrated by the experience of the BEPER project in Turkey.

- In principle, the introduction of client service charters in Tanzania is a positive development because CSCs set transparent standards of service delivery which provide the basis for holding public agencies to account. In practice, there is no evidence to date that the charters have improved public sector performance, as measured by the timeliness of service delivery. Three conditions are necessary for CSCs to have a greater impact: (i) information about the charters needs to be more widely disseminated in the local language(s); (ii) citizens and CSOs need to use

the charters more vigorously; and (iii) politicians and public officials must be made more responsive to any failures to meet charter standards.

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SCHOOL REPORT 2002

Colégio Estadual Avelino A. Vieira
Rua Julio Mesquita, 12
81330-430 Curitiba-PR

School Performance Assessment, 2000

		Mean	Number of Pupils Assessed	Pupils at Level I	Pupils at Level II	Pupils at Level III	Ppils at Level IV	Mean	Number of Pupils Assessed	Mean	Number of Pupils Assessed
		This School						**Other Schools in Your Municipality**			**Paraná**
Portuguese	4th	*						257	7,232	250	39,239
	8th	258 AP	61	16%	25%	25%	34%	263	4,852	250	31,125
Math	4th	*						255	7,101	250	38,441
	8th	262 AC	56	23%	11%	27%	39%	261	4,712	250	31,007
Science	4th	*						254	7,055	250	38,033
	8th	251 AB	63	19%	30%	25%	25%	260	4,743	250	31,125

Source: SEED/NIE, AVA 2000
School Effects:

AC	Average above the expected mean, given the profile of the pupils assessed.
AB	Average below the expected mean, given the profile of the pupils assessed.
AP	Average roughly equal to the expected mean, given the profile of the pupils assessed.

Promotion, Repetition, and Dropout

	This School			Municipality			Paraná		
	Grade 1-4	Grades 5-8	Secondary Education	Grade 1-4	Grades 5-8	Secondary Education	Grade 1-4	Grades 5-8	Secondary Education
Promotion	*	67%	78%	95%	79%	71%	89%	81%	75%
Repetition	*	33%	20%	4%	16%	13%	9%	9%	10%
Dropout	*	0%	2%	2%	5%	15%	2%	2%	15%

Source: MEC/INEP/SEEC, *Censo Escolar 2002 (Resultados Preliminares)*.
Note: Data refers to the 2001 school year for public schools in formal education.
  *The school (or municipality) did not offer this level of education.

Teachers and Students

	Total [2]	This School			Municipality			Paraná		
		Grade 1-4	Grades 5-8	Secondary Education	Grade 1-4	Grades 5-8	Secondary Education	Grade 1-4	Grades 5-8	Secondary Education
Pupils	2,192	*	1,381	811	113,573	100,754	65,965	825,850	737,602	408,020
Average class size		*	37	39	30	35	38	27	34	37
Teachers		*	47	34	6,048	4,193	2,765	39,255	37,464	22,938
Teachers w/ higher education			100%	100%	67%	98%	98%	46%	97%	97%

Source: MEC/INEP/SEEC, *Censo Escolar 2002 (Resultados Preliminares)*.
Data from public schools: total pupils in primary and secondary education.

- The school (or municipality) did not offer this level of education.
- The state government standard for pupil class ratio varies from a minimum of 25 to a mazimum of 30 pupils per class for 1st to 4th grade, 30–40 pupils per class for 5th to 8th grade, 30–45 pupils per class for secondary education.

Box 2: Publication of SIMCE test scores on a school website in Chile

Colegios San Joaquín y San José
### obras de la Fundación Astoreca

ASTORECA
FUNDACION

Resultados SIMCE

El Colegio San Joaquín suma un nuevo logro en su esfuerzo por entregar educación de calidad. La recientemente entregada prueba SIMCE que rindieron el 2004 los 8° básicos, así lo revela. Porque nuestro colegio obtuvo nada menos que el tercer lugar a nivel nacional en su grupo socioeconómico, lo que es todo un orgullo para la directiva de la Fundación Marcelo Astoreca.

Eso no es todo. Los resultados que obtuvieron los alumnos del San Joaquín se acercan mucho al promedio obtenido por los colegios particulares pagados. En Lenguaje, el promedio de los particulares fue de 296, en Matemáticas de 305, en Comprensión del Medio de 305 y en Comprensión de la Sociedad 291. El San Joaquín, por su parte, obtuvo 296, 307, 307 y 291, respectivamente.

Grupo Medio Bajo							
	Comuna	**Región**	**Dependencia**	**Matemáticas**	**Lenguaje**	**Sociedad**	**Naturaleza**
1. **Escuela Francisco Ramírez**	San Ramón	13	Part. Subven.	333	315	337	352
2. **Escuela Elsa Ramírez**	San Ramón	13	Part. Subven.	298	300	305	295
3. **Colegio San Joaquín**	Renca	13	Part. Subven.	307	296	291	307
4. **Escuela rural Villa Chacao**	Ancud	10	Municipal	288	299	280	291
5. **Colegio Almendral de La Pintana**	La Pintana	13	Part. Subven.	287	298	275	283

Los resultados obtenidos por el colegio año a año avalan el trabajo desarrollado por directores y docentes durante sus 15 años de su existencia y dan cuenta de que sí se puede entregar educación de calidad en sectores de escasos recursos.

Resultados SIMCE 2003 - II°M por tipo de dependencia

Box 3: Data sources for indicators used to construct the Public Institutions Integrity Index in Colombia, 2003-2004

Dimension of Integrity	Indicator	Description	Source
Transparency	Web page	Measures the structure, content and ease of access of the web site	Organisation's web site
	Complaints system	Measures existence and functioning of the complaints system via the web site, availability of a free phone line (018000) and the follow-up/monitoring of complaints	Telephone poll by TI Organisation's web site Data provided by the organisation
	Procurement	Assess information on procurement procedures available on organisation's web site and on the Single Procurement Portal	Organisation's web site Single Procurement Portal
	Fulfilment of requirements of the Information System for the Control of Public Contracts (SICE)	Assess whether those organisations obliged by law (Acuerdo 0001 of 2004) have registered in the SICE Portal and have published their Purchase Plan and its contracts	SICE Portal
	Accountability to citizens	Assess whether the organisation has undertaken any accountability exercises to citizens via its web site or by other means	Organisation's web site Data provided by the organisation
	Administrative procedures	Assess whether the organisation has registered its procedures with the Departamento Administrativo de la Funcion Publica and on its own web site. Check whether it is possible to carry out procedures on-line and that the organisation has in place mechanisms for rationalising, simplifying and eliminating procedures.	Departamento Administrativo de la Funcion Publica Departamento Nacional de Planeacion Organisation's web site
	Anti-corruption efforts	Assess the organisation's efforts to combat corruption among its own staff	Data provided by the organisation
	Availability of information	Calculate the amount of information supplied by the organisation as a proportion of the information requested by TI to construct indicators	TI Colombia
Investigation and sanctions	Fiscal aggregate	Calculate the number of fiscal responsibility judgments and judicial accusations issued per ten employees	Contraloria General de la Republica Contraloria Delegada de Investigaciones, Juicios Fiscales and Jurisdiccion Coactiva Boletines de Fallos de Responsabilidad Fiscal
	Disciplinary aggregate	Calculate the number of job related complaints and disciplinary sanctions applied per ten employees	Procuraduria General de la Nacion
	Total value of fiscal responsibility judgments	Calculate the total value of fiscal responsibility judgments made against the organisation as a percentage of its budget	Contraloria General de la Republica
Institutionality and efficiency	Denunciations, inquiries and investigations	Calculate the number of denunciations, inquiries and investigations related to fiscal responsibility per ten employees	Contraloria General de la Republica
	Denunciations, inquiries and investigations	Calculate the number of denunciations, inquiries and investigations related to internal disciplinary processes per ten employees	Procuraduria General de la Nacion
	Corruption risk in contracts	Assess the corruption risk on the basis of eight variables by amending the methodology of the Indicator System of Institutional Risk (SIRI) used by the Contraloria General de la Republica	Data provided by the organisation
	Public employment risk	Calculate the wage gap, ratio of support staff to total staff and ratio of subcontracted personnel to total staff	Data provided by the organisation
	Meritocracy and staff assessment	Assess how meritocratic are the procedures for hiring and firing managers in charge of internal controls. Check whether staff assessments are carried out.	Data provided by the organisation

	Improvement in internal systems of control	Assess progress in improving internal control systems against the base line set by the reference survey undertaken by the Departamento Administrativo de la Funcion Publica	Departamento Administrativo de la Funcion Publica
	Implementation of Improvement Plan	Assess progress in the implementation of the organisation's Improvement Plan	Contraloria General de la Republica Contraloria Delegadas Sectoriales
	Quality of Management	Assess the organisation's quality of management against the diagnostic report of the Contraloria General de la Republica	Contraloria General de la Republica
	Implementation of cost controls	Refer to the report by the Contraloria General de la Republica as to whether the organisation has violated its cost ceiling	Contraloria General de la Republica - Contraloria Delegada Economia y Finanzas Publicas